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I. INTRODUCTION
Losing one's job has long been recognized as one of the most stress-
ful and traumatic experiences a person may ever endure.' However,
in many cases, the terminated employee has no remedy against his
employer because the vast majority of employees in the United States
are at-will employees, meaning that the employer can terminate the
employee for good reason, bad reason, or no reason at all. 2 Scholars
and courts have criticized the harshness of the employment at-will
presumption because, despite the fact that there are many statutory
and common law exceptions prohibiting some of the worst reasons for
termination,3 many truly egregious 4 terminations are left unremed-
1. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model
Employment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 849, 852 (1994) (stating that the
"human tragedy wrought by such wrongful terminations is immeasurable" and it
is not surprising that "many employees suffer severe emotional trauma when
they are discharged").
2. See Joseph E. Slater, The "American Rule" that Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMiP.
RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 53 (2007); infra Part II.
3. See infra Part II.
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ied.5 Other scholars criticize the at-will presumption because it forces
terminated employees to rely on anti-discrimination statutes even if
there is no evidence that discrimination was the motivation for the
termination decision. 6 The proliferation of these meritless claims
causes many problems, including public suspicion about the necessity
or effectiveness of our anti-discrimination laws, as well as an em-
ployer's reluctance to hire employees who might be deemed more diffi-
cult to fire because they can at least fashion a plausible claim against
their employers (regardless of the ultimate success of that claim).7
Many critics of at-will employment suggest that the United States
should follow the course of unionized employers and almost all Euro-
pean countries 8 and adopt a just cause standard. Such a standard
precludes termination unless the employer can prove that it had just
(or good) cause for the termination.9
Others vigorously defend the employment at-will presumption and
critique the inefficiency of a just cause standard.1o The primary prob-
lem with the just cause standard is that it is difficult for employers to
prove, which makes it inefficient." Because of this problem of proof,
many employers are forced to waste large sums of money litigating
terminations or paying very large, and often undeserved, severance
payments.12 Some employers even retain unproductive employees be-
4. My use of the word "egregious" throughout this Article refers to its common dic-
tionary definition of "conspicuously bad or offensive." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 589 (3d ed. 1992).
5. See infra subsection III.A.2; see also Martin Malin, The Distributive & Corrective
Justice Concerns in the Debate over Employment At-Will: Some Preliminary
Thoughts, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 117, 118 (1992) (stating the at-will rule "refuses
to die").
6. See infra subsection III.A.3.
7. See infra subsection III.A.3.
8. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 306, introductory cmt.
(2002) (noting that the "whole of the European Community, Scandinavia, Japan,
Canada, and most of South America" have just cause protections for their em-
ployees); Slater, supra note 2, at 57 (stating that Western European and other
industrial democracies use a just cause standard).
9. See, e.g., MODEL TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 303, introductory cmt. (2002); Ed-
ward Robert Cottone, Employee Protection from Unjust Discharge: A Proposal for
Judicial Reversal of the Terminable-At-Will Doctrine, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1259 (2002); Ann McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At Will:
Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996);
Kathleen McGowan, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will Employment: The Search
for a Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 141 (1998); Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed
Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 56 (1988).
10. See infra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See JOHN F. BUCKLEY IV & MICHAEL R. LINDSAY, DEFENSE OF EQUAL EMPLOY-
MENT CLAIMS § 13.5 (2d ed. 2007) (stating that although "[aill litigation is expen-
sive ... employment discrimination litigation is particularly so," these costs are
enough to make many employers settle out of court simply to avoid them). Many
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cause it is cheaper and easier to continue paying them than it is to
terminate them.13
This debate has been raging for years,14 but it is not the primary
purpose of this Article to rehash the debate over the value of employ-
ment at-will. Instead of taking sides, I find fault with both at-will em-
ployment and the just cause standard. 15 Accordingly, the main
purpose of this Article is to provide the perfect compromise between
at-will employment and the just cause standard.
Under this proposed statute (which I have named the "Employ-
ment Termination Equity Act (ETEA)"), employers would be free to
terminate without the burden of proving just cause, allowing them to
get rid of unproductive or poorly performing employees with limited
risk of litigation. However, certain enumerated reasons for termina-
tion would be unlawful. In determining which termination decisions
are egregious enough to prohibit, my goal was two-fold: (1) to prohibit
termination decisions that have previously been unremedied despite
the morass of exceptions to at-will employment and (2) to provide
some overlap protection with current statutes by using a procedural
process that will be more easily accessible by employees. Yet, in the
true spirit of compromise, the ETEA will provide fewer types of reme-
European countries have a civil law system that makes termination difficult and
costly; the statutes restrict the grounds of dismissal and provide redress for a
violation. A survey of the European Union in 1990 found that the average termi-
nation costs employers twenty-two weeks of wages. See THOMAS J. ATCHINSON,
DAVID W. BELCHER & DAVID J. THOMSEN, INTERNET BASED BENEFITS & COMPEN-
SATION ADMINISTRATION (2004), available at http://www.eridlc.com/on-
linetextbook/chpt2 1; see also Laurie Leader & Melissa Burger, Let's Get a Vision:
Drafting Effective Arbitration Agreements in Employment and Effecting Other
Safeguards to Insure Equal Access to Justice, 8 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 87, 90
(2004) (noting that employers' costs and fees average in excess of $100,000 if an
employment case is tried); Michael J. Phillips, Toward a Middle Way in the Po-
larized Debate over Employment At Will, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 441, 452 (1992) (argu-
ing that the problem with just cause is that it appears to bar "good-faith
discharges based on reasonable economic considerations"). But see Guy Davidov,
In Defense of (Efficiently Administered) "Just Cause" Dismissal Laws, 23 INT'L J.
Comp. LAB. L. & INDUS. REL., 2007, at 1, 14 (arguing that the costs of a just cause
standard are not that significant).
13. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 452 (pointing out that the threat of litigation les-
sens the ability to fire or discipline bad employees); see also MODEL EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 303, introductory cmt. (2002) (providing that the
provisions of the Model Act should offer "much speedier, more informal, more
expert, and less expensive proceedings").
14. A Westlaw search revealed 266 articles discussing 'at-will" employment, dating
back to 1980. The search was a broad one, including any article that included "at
will" in its title. Obviously, some of these articles only dealt with narrow issues
surrounding the at-will relationship, and some articles could have been excluded
by the search if they did not use the phrase "at will" in their titles. In any event,
the topic of at-will employment has received quite a bit of attention.
15. See infra Part III.
20081
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
dies than employment discrimination statutes and will force plaintiffs
to choose between suit under the ETEA and other statutory
remedies. 16
Part II of this Article will give the reader a brief overview of the
state of the law, including the current status of the at-will employ-
ment rule and the many exceptions that have eroded the employment
at-will presumption. Part III will discuss why both the at-will pre-
sumption and the just cause standard are problematic and why a com-
promise between the two is necessary. Part IV will detail the
substantive and procedural provisions in my proposed statutory solu-
tion. I will explain which terminations should be prohibited and why.
More importantly, I will reveal the procedural nuances in the statute
that help to make it a true compromise statute. Finally, Part V will
address the anticipated challenges to this proposal.
As a compromise proposal, either no one wins or everyone wins,
depending on one's level of optimism. Many believe that the measure
of a good compromise is when it leaves everyone unhappy. But my
goal is to convince the reader to view this proposal in an optimistic
light-as a massive improvement over the status quo and hopefully as
the perfect compromise.
II. THE LAW
A. Employment At-Will Presumption
In 1877, H.G. Wood established the standard of employment at-
will in America. In doing so, Wood abandoned the English employ-
ment standard.17 There has been some debate as to whether Wood's
treatise was supported by then existing case law.1 8 Regardless of the
merits of that debate, it is clear that courts quickly accepted Wood's
at-will employment rule.19 However, in recent years, there has been a
shift away from the strict employment at-will standard in favor of giv-
ing employees more protection against unjust dismissal. This move-
ment has been initiated by both courts and legislators.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT COVERING THE
RELATION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 282-83 (John
D. Parsons, Jr. 2d ed. 1886) (1877) (discussing English rule that creates merely a
presumption of employment for a year that may be rebutted by proof or
presumption).
18. See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employ-
ment-At-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
91, 91-94 (1996).
19. See Martin v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) ("[W]e think the
rule is correctly stated by Mr. Wood and it has been adopted in a number of




B. Common Law Exceptions
The common law exceptions to the at-will presumption vary widely
by state but basically encompass two main categories: (1) contractual
claims and (2) wrongful discharge claims based in tort, alleging viola-
tions of public policy.
The first exception used by courts to ameliorate the harshness of
employment at-will is recognizing implied in fact contracts. Even if
there is not a formal written contract, a contractual obligation to ter-
minate only for good cause can be implied in fact either because of oral
promises given to the employee by someone in management or be-
cause the handbook or other policies give rise to an inference that the
employee will only be terminated for just cause.20 For instance, courts
may read into the contract an employee handbook, which establishes a
just cause termination standard. 21 These claims were very popular
for several years, but now most employers have become savvier about
the potential liability from these claims. Accordingly, employers are
careful to avoid giving representations of continued employment and
have modified their employee handbooks to avoid these implied in fact
claims.2 2
Another, less used contractual claim is the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, which applies to virtually all contracts. 23
This contract rule prohibits one party from taking away an agreed
upon benefit from another party.24 However, with few exceptions pro-
viding limited relief,25 courts have held that the implied covenant of
20. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.17 (4th ed. 2004); see also Cheryl S.
Massingale, At-Will Employment: Going, Going .. , 24 U. RICH. L. REV. 187, 195
(1990) ("An implied contract may be found in the terms of an employee handbook,
policy manual, memorandum, and oral statements made by the employer.").
21. See Arch of Wyo., Inc. v. Sisneros, 971 P.2d 981, 984 (Wyo. 1999).
22. See Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Triparite Division of American Work
Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 195 (2007) (stating that employers
reacted to employee handbook cases by including disclaimers in handbooks and
other employee manuals); Slater, supra note 2, at 98 (arguing that this claim can
be avoided by using disclaimers).
23. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, § 7.17; see also Peter Linzer, The Decline of As-
sent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the Breakdown of Private Law The-
ory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 341-44 (1986) (viewing the exception of implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing as an extension of traditional tort and property
law).
24. See Mark E. Brossman, Laurie C. Malkin & Rosemarie M. Coppola, Beyond the
Implied Contract: The Public Policy Exception, the Implied Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing, and Other Limitations on an Employer's Discretion in the
At-Will Setting, 651 PLULIT 7, 65 (2001).
25. See, e.g., Wakefield v. N. Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing
terminated, at-will employee's claim that he was fired to deprive him of a large
sales commission); Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass.
1977) (allowing a terminated salesman to sue for unpaid commissions based on
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing).
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good faith does not and cannot apply to a termination claim when the
employee is an at-will employee. This is because a good faith standard
cannot co-exist with the rule that an employer can fire an employee for
no reason or even a bad reason, as is the case under the employment
at-will presumption.26
The most frequently used exception to the employment at-will pre-
sumption is when an employee sues for wrongful discharge under tort
law, alleging that the termination violated public policy.27 These
causes of action vary widely by state, but there are three primary pro-
tections created by the public policy exceptions. 28 First, courts have
protected an employee's right against termination if he refuses to
break the law.2 9 Second, courts have carved out an exception when an
employee is performing a public obligation, such as "performing jury
duty, attending depositions, honoring subpoenas, and engaging in
similar public obligations."3 0 Finally, an employee may be protected
from termination when she is exercising a legal right. This exception
includes "filing workers compensation claims, suing employers, engag-
ing in union or political activities, protesting unsafe working condi-
tions[, and] refusing to take a polygraph test."3 1 Some jurisdictions
have codified this public policy exception; 3 2 however, in most other ju-
risdictions, confusion reigns as courts apply the exception haphaz-
ardly, leading to little predictability.3 3
C. Statutory Exceptions
Legislators have also limited the scope of the employment at-will
presumption. Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
26. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, § 7.17; J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment
and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law,
81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 359-62 (1995) (arguing that the implied covenant of good
faith should be abandoned as it applies to at-will doctrine).
27. Throughout this Article, I refer to these claims as either "wrongful discharge"
claims or "violation of public policy" claims. For my purposes, these terms refer
to the same cause of action.
28. See Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach, 73
U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 539-43 (2004); Brossman, Malkin & Coppola, supra note 24,
at 48; Massingale, supra note 20, at 191 (stating .that some states have recog-
nized a tort cause of action of retaliatory discharge in three categories of cases:
"(1) exercise of a statutorily granted right; (2) refusal to obey employer demands
to disobey the law; and (3) whistle blowing").
29. See Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1452 (10th Cir. 1997); Anderson v.
ITT Indus. Corp., 92 F. Supp. 2d. 516, 522 (E.D. Va. 2000) ("[Tlhe employment-at-
will doctrine was not intended to 'serve as a shield for employers who seek to
force their employees, under the threat of discharge, to engage in criminal
activity.'").
30. Brossman, Malkin & Coppola, supra note 24, at 55.
31. Id. at 57.
32. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 230(a)-(b) (West 2003).
33. See infra subsection III.A.1.
[Vol. 87:62
THE PERFECT COMPROMISE
1964 ("Title VII") to combat discrimination on the basis of "race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."34 Subsequent federal legislation has
been passed to protect against termination on the basis of age35 and
disability.36 Federal legislation has been supplemented by state stat-
utes banning termination for discriminatory reasons.3 7
Labor legislation and collective bargaining have also restricted an
employer's discretion to fire at-will. In 1935, Congress enacted the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),38 which allowed employees to
collectively bargain. 39 Most collective bargaining agreements incorpo-
rate a "just cause" standard for termination of employees.4 0 Just
cause is typically defined in the agreement; usually, the termination
must be reasonable and neither arbitrary, excessive, nor
discriminatory.41
Whistleblower statutes, based on anti-retaliation principles,42
have been enacted in all fifty states4 3 and at the federal level.44 The
primary purpose of these laws is to "expose, deter, and curtail wrong-
doing" by allowing employees protection from employer retaliation for
reporting some violation of law by the employer. 4 5 These statutes
vary greatly in scope and effectiveness.46
In addition to these statutes that prohibit termination for certain
reasons, some statutes give employees just cause protection. For in-
stance, most government employees enjoy some protection against ter-
mination based on civil service legislation.4 7 Furthermore, one state
and two jurisdictions have attempted to directly modify or eliminate
the at-will presumption. Montana directly repealed the employment
at-will doctrine with the 1987 "Wrongful Discharge from Employment
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
35. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
37. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 711(a)(1) (2005); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-
1402.11(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1009(a)(1) (2000).
38. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000)
39. See id.
40. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in
Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DuKE L.J. 594, 594.
41. Id. at 595.
42. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 108 (2000).
43. Id. at 100.
44. See, e.g., False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2000); Whistleblower Protections
Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
45. Callahan & Dworkin, supra note 42, at 100.
46. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Where There's At-Will, There are Many Ways: Redressing
the Increasing Incoherence of Employment At Will, 67 U. PiTr. L. REV. 295,
308-13 (2005) (criticizing New York's ineffective statute and rejection of common
law public policy claims).
47. See, e.g., Cottone, supra note 9.
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Act."48 The Act states a discharge is wrongful if it "was not for good
cause."4 9 "Good cause" is defined as "reasonable job-related grounds
for dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties,
disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business
reason."50 Employers were in support of the legislation because they
preferred the limitation on damages more than the freedom to fire at-
will.51 The Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico also depart from the at-will
standard. 5 2
III. DISMISSING THE ALTERNATIVES
A. The Problem with At-Will Employment
Despite all of these statutory and common law exceptions, employ-
ment at-will is still alive and well and still affects, in a significant
way, the employment relationship. As one scholar noted, "The em-
ployer's divine right to dismiss at any time, for any reason, and with-
out notice has survived with vigor."5 3 This subpart will discuss the
problems with the at-will presumption.
1. Inconsistency and Mass Confusion
First, because the at-will presumption is so harsh, courts have in-
consistently applied the at-will rule and its exceptions, leading to
much confusion and very little predictability.54 Many scholars have
recognized that the inconsistency of the law is problematic.55 One
48. Moss, supra note 46; Parker, supra note 26, at 371-76.
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)(b) (2005).
50. Id. § 39-2-903(5) (2005).
51. See Slater, supra note 2, at 103-04.
52. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 76(a) (1997 & Supp. 2005) (listing nine reasons why an
employer may dismiss an employee and stating that "[a]ny employee discharged
for reasons other than those stated in subsection (a) of this section shall be con-
sidered to have been wrongfully discharged . . . ."); id. § 76(c) (1997); P.R. LAws
ANN. tit. 29, § 185b(a)-(f) (2001) (defining good cause for the discharge of an em-
ployee and stating that "[a] discharge made by the mere whim of the employer
with or without cause relative to the proper and normal operation of the estab-
lishment shall not be considered as a discharge for good cause."); see also Slater,
supra note 2, at 103 (naming the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico as among those
U.S. jurisdictions that "have already eliminated the at-will rule entirely ....").
53. Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 73 (2000).
54. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 303, introductory cmt. (2002).
There are many articles that have been written about the public policy exception
to employment at-will. It is not the purpose of this Article to delve into those
cases. For an interesting discussion of the inconsistencies, see Moss, supra note
46.
55. See, e.g., Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of Employment
Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 291 (2005) (commenting on the confusion as
to whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can apply in at-will
employment relationships and noting that the draft restatement does not go very
[Vol. 87:62
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scholar who has recently delved into this inconsistency notes, "States
haphazardly adopt some proposed exceptions while rejecting others
that similarly limit employers' at-will discretion."56 This lack of pre-
dictability, of course, often leads to increased litigation because par-
ties are unable to predict the result of the litigation, 57 so are less
willing to settle. Furthermore, from an employer's perspective, the
lack of consistency in the application of the at-will presumption and
its exceptions makes it difficult for national companies to have a na-
tional policy regarding termination decisions.58 Of course, many ar-
eas of the law are decided on a state-by-state basis, and not all
inconsistency is seen as a compelling rationale for federal legislation.
Accordingly, while the inconsistency and confusion in the law is one
problem with the at-will presumption, it is not the most pressing
problem.
2. The Egregious Termination Cases
A more pressing problem with the at-will presumption is that there
are many terminations that most reasonable people would agree are
egregious and yet are not unlawful under any of the statutes or com-
mon law claims mentioned above. Below is just a sample of the termi-
nation cases I found troubling. In all of the following cases, the courts
found that there was no remedy under any of the claims pursued by
the plaintiffs.
Many egregious cases involve a plaintiff who was terminated for
reporting troubling behavior of another employee to the employer. In
one such case, Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.,59 the plaintiff sued for
wrongful discharge, alleging that he was terminated because he re-
ported to management that his new supervisor was being investigated
far to eliminate the doctrinal incoherence in the law); Rachel Leiser Levy, Judi-
cial Interpretation of Employee Handbooks: The Creation of a Common Law Infor-
mation-Eliciting Penalty Default Rule, 72 U. CH. L. REV. 695, 722 (2005)
(arguing that the current law governing employment terminations has become
confusing and that there needs to be more uniformity across states since most
companies are becoming more national); Moss, supra note 46 (providing an in-
depth analysis of the doctrinal inconsistency in the law surrounding employment
at-will); Christopher L. Pennington, The Public Policy Exception to the Employ-
ment-At-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1583
(1994) (arguing, as the title suggests, that the public policy exception is riddled
with inconsistencies); Slater, supra note 2, at 54.
56. Moss, supra note 46, at 301.
57. See Slater, supra note 2, at 99 (stating that there is increased litigation and fear
of litigation because neither side can be certain what the law will do in this area).
58. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for Title
VII Protection, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 34-35 (2000) [hereinafter Porter, Marital
Status Discrimination] (noting a similar problem with inconsistency among state
laws protecting marital status discrimination).
59. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
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by the FBI for embezzlement at the supervisor's former employer.60
Despite the fact that the plaintiff disclosed this information because of
his concern for the company, the supervisor nevertheless eventually
terminated him, allegedly to silence him.61 The court held that the
plaintiffs public policy claim failed, concluding that there is no sub-
stantial public policy prohibiting an employer from discharging an em-
ployee for reporting possible prior illegal behavior of another
employee. 62 Because precedents emphasized that the employee's be-
havior must protect the public, the court reasoned that "[wihen the
duty of an employee to disclose information to his employer serves
only the private interest of the employer, the rationale underlying the
[public policy claims] is not implicated."63
Other retaliatory discharge cases should arguably have been pro-
hibited by anti-discrimination laws but were not. For instance, in one
case, a white employee was terminated for stating to a co-worker
"Blacks have rights too."64 The employee apparently made this com-
ment because he believed his employer was "fixing to physically as-
sault the black males to get them off the property."6 5 The co-worker to
whom the plaintiff said this reported the comment to Donna Dallman,
the plaintiffs supervisor. 6 6 According to the plaintiff, Dallman subse-
quently said to him, "I think you're a fucking nigger lover. Sit your
God damn ass down on that fucking stool, shut your mouth, and do
your fucking work."6 7 She then said, "On second thought, get your
fucking ass out of here. I don't want you working for me anymore."68
The court in this case stated, "[Ilt would appear that when Dallman
finally decided to dismiss Bullard [plaintifi], it was on the basis of her
personal dislike for him and her general dissatisfaction with Bullard
as an employee." 69 Even if the court was willing to accept the plain-
tiffs argument that he was dismissed because Dallman perceived him
to be overly sympathetic toward African Americans, the court held
that "Ms. Dallman was still entitled to terminate the at-will employ-
60. Id. at 375.
61. Id. at 375-76.
62. Id. at 380.
63. Id. This case is good evidence of how narrowly the public policy claim has been
interpreted.
64. Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630, 632 (Nev. 1995).
65. Id. at 632 n.3. The facts are not overly clear in this case, but it appears that,
according to the court, it can be inferred that the Bigelow company had engaged
in a rental policy that discriminated against African Americans, and that agents
were instructed to use "deception and subterfuge to prevent African-Americans
from becoming tenants in Bigelow rentals." Id. at 633.
66. Id. at 632 n.3.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 633.
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ment."70 The court reasoned that only if the plaintiff had refused to
engage in discriminatory behavior or had made a formal complaint to
management, would he have a public policy claim. 7 1 Because he made
a very quiet protest to a co-worker, rather than a more prominent op-
position to a supervisor, he did not have a violation of public policy
claim.72 Even though he did not bring a claim under Title VII, his
complaint, alleging retaliation for protesting racial discrimination,
might have similarly failed under Title VII.73
Perhaps even more egregious than terminating an employee in re-
taliation for making legitimate complaints is terminating an employee
because she was the victim of domestic violence. In Green v. Bryant,
the plaintiff was raped and brutally beaten at gun point by her es-
tranged husband. 74 When she returned to work and told one of the
doctors for whom she worked about the abuse, the plaintiff was subse-
quently terminated and told that her termination was solely because
70. Id.
71. Id. at 634.
72. Id. In fact, one can infer from the court's opinion that the judge condemned the
plaintiff because he did not make a more prominent complaint. In footnote 4 of
the opinion, the court states:
Bullard's protest, or, better, protestation (if, indeed it can be called that)
was pretty sickly. He apparently was not willing to make such state-
ments in the presence of Dallman. When Dallman asked him if he had
"a problem" with the company he was quick to deny it. If Bullard had
ever "stood up" to Dallman and said something like, "Look here,
Dallman, I am sick and tired of the way you treat Blacks around here,
and I am not going to put up with it any longer," he might have had a
better case. He did not come close to doing this, and as a result he can-
not bring himself under [the precedent case] and show that he was dis-
missed because he did or refused to do something in his employment
that offended this state's public policy.
Id. at 634 n.4.
73. His claim would probably have failed under the anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000), because he would have to prove that he had a
reasonable belief that he has opposed practices that are unlawful under Title VII.
See generally Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90 MiNN. L. REV. 18, 76-86 (2005)
(arguing that the reasonable belief doctrine is one of the most problematic limits
to the retaliation doctrine). Professor Brake has criticized the reasonable belief
doctrine for enforcing artificial lines between victims and non-victims. Id. at
94-98. For instance, in Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Dept., the plaintiffs
retaliation claim failed because he had complained about his police department's
treatment of minority citizens. Id. at 95 (citation omitted). Because the court
found that the white police officer did not have a reasonable belief that the de-
partment's treatment of non-employees, i.e., citizens, violates Title VII, his retali-
ation claim failed. Id. at 96. One can imagine a similar holding in the Bigelow
case because he had complained about his employer's treatment of potential
customers.
74. Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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of her status as a domestic violence victim. 75 She sued, alleging that
the termination violated two public policies: protecting an employee's
right to privacy and protecting victims of domestic violence.7 6 The
court disagreed with her assertion that the discharge violated her pri-
vacy rights because she voluntarily disclosed the violence to one of the
doctors with whom she worked, and the employer took no actions to
further intrude upon her privacy.7 7 With regard to the public policy of
protecting victims, the court stated that the statutes relied upon by
the plaintiff do not create a protected employment class, and there-
fore, the plaintiff cannot rely on them to establish her wrongful dis-
charge claim.78 Only if the plaintiff had been terminated for seeking
assistance from the victim's rights statutes would she have possibly
had a claim.79
Another case where an employer interfered with its employee's pri-
vate life was the case of Frankel v. Warwick Hotel.8 0 Here, a man
worked as the restaurant manager for a hotel in which his father was
a part-owner.8 1 During his employment, the son married a woman
that the father disapproved of because she was Catholic. The father
told the son that he had to divorce his wife or be fired.82 Of course, the
son "chose" to be fired.83 The court dismissed plaintiffs claim for
wrongful discharge in violation of the public policy, stating that the
plaintiff had failed to point to a public policy sufficient to support his
claim.84 While some might agree with this result because the case
involved a family relationship (the father and son), the court did not
75. Id. ("Ms. Green asserts that Dr. Bryant told her that the discharge had nothing to
do with plaintiffs performance at work, but was based solely upon her being the
victim of a violent crime.").
76. Id. at 801.
77. Id.
78. Id. Of course, if those statutes did explicitly provide for employment protection,
the plaintiff would not even need to rely on the public policy claim; she could sue
directly under the statute. For a further discussion of the rights (or lack thereof)
afforded to employees who are terminated for being victims of domestic violence,
see Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termination the Solu-
tion When Domestic Violence Comes to Work? 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275 (2006)
[hereinafter Porter, Victimizing the Abused].
79. Green, 887 F. Supp. at 801; see also Imes v. City of Asheville, 594 S.E.2d 397
(N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a male employee, who was terminated for be-
ing a victim of domestic violence after he was hospitalized when he was shot by
his wife, did not state a viable cause of action for wrongful discharge based on the
public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine).
80. 881 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
81. Id. at 185.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 186-87.
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limit its result to that particular fact and never discussed the familial
relationship between the parties.8 5
Other employees have been terminated without a remedy for (1)
refusing to end a relationship with a co-employee that was neither in-
terfering with the plaintiffs employment nor violating an explicit
work rule;s 6 (2) riding a motorcycle, piloting private planes, and smok-
ing;8 7 and (3) having a child out of wedlock.88 The above cases re-
present a small sampling of the cases where employees were
terminated for egregious reasons and left with no remedy. These
cases reveal a serious problem in need of a solution.
3. Undermines Anti-Discrimination Statutes
The third (and arguably most compelling) problem with the at-will
presumption is that it undermines anti-discrimination statutes.8 9 It
is undisputed that plaintiffs do not fare well when bringing employ-
ment discrimination claims. 90 This fact is informative for two rea-
85. Id. I tend to agree that employment laws should not interfere with the employ-
ment relationships between family members in small, "mom and pop" businesses.
However, the Warwick Hotel was not such a business. The family relationship
might explain why the father cared about the religion of his son's wife, but it does
not make the termination decision any less egregious.
86. See Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854, 857 (Or. 1986) (holding that even
though it might seem "harsh" that an employer can fire an employee because of
"dislike of the employe[e]'s personal lifestyle," plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim
fails).
87. Ann L. Rives, Note, You're Not the Boss of Me: A Call for Federal Lifestyle Dis-
crimination Legislation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 553, 556 (2006). Presumably,
employees in these cases were terminated because their behavior was believed to
lead to the increased risk of significant health care costs.
88. See, e.g., Johnson v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382 N.W.2d 543, 546 (Minn. Ct. App.
1986).
89. See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination At Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 84 (2007) ("[Mlost U.S.
scholars see a conflict between the goals and principles underlying the employ-
ment at-will doctrine and the goals and principles underlying employment dis-
crimination law."). It can also be argued that the at-will rule undermines the
effectiveness of the National Labor Relations Act. Slater, supra note 2, at 54
("[The at-will rule] is crippling the effectiveness of the two most important excep-
tions to that doctrine, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), two of the most significant federal
statutes of the twentieth century.") (footnotes omitted). However, this Article
will focus only on how at-will undermines Title VII and other anti-discrimination
statutes. See also Fischl, supra note 22, at 180 (stating that the at-will rule is a
baseline not only in common law decision making, but also in interpreting other
statutes-Title VII and the NLRA).
90. For instance, one study indicated that plaintiffs only won 27.4% of employment
claims that were decided by the trial court. Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing:
Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 942 (2006).
Another study indicated that only 15% of the claims filed with the EEOC resulted
in some type of relief provided to plaintiffs. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment
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sons. First, it tells us that there are probably many meritorious
claims that fail because of the difficult burden of proof standard under
current discrimination case law.9 1 The current state of the law makes
it very difficult to prove the decision-maker was motivated by discrim-
inatory animus, especially when so much discrimination happens at
the subconscious level.92 However, the low success rate for employ-
ment discrimination plaintiffs also speaks to another problem, which
is the overuse of our discrimination laws. Assume an employee gets
terminated and believes the termination was unfair. Because the em-
ployment at-will presumption precludes most other causes of action,
the employee's only cause of action is likely to be a discrimination
claim.93 Because she believes that the decision was unfair and be-
cause the employer might not have given her a reason for the termina-
tion, she assumes discrimination based on her sex, her race, her age,
or medical impairment/disability must have been the motivation. 94
Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win? 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (2001) [hereinafter
Selmi, Hard to Win]. A third study indicated that "[pilaintiffs in employment
cases succeeded on only 18.7 percent of the cases tried before a judge .... " Id. at
560; see Ann C. Hodges, The Limits of Multiple Rights and Remedies: A Call for
Revisiting the Law of the Workplace, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 601, 612
(2005) (stating that plaintiffs have limited success at every level of the judicial
process). Plaintiffs in employment law cases have a lower success rate than both
insurance and personal injury cases. Further, plaintiffs' victories in employment
discrimination cases are reversed more frequently than defendants'. Id. Other
scholars have pointed out that Title VII has not been as effective as some had
hoped. See, e.g., Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 5 (2005).
91. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY, 151 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003); Fischl, supra
note 22, at 183-84 (arguing that the burdens of proof in discrimination cases
make it difficult to prove the required intent in order to win the case); see also
infra subsection IV.E.2 (arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), has made the plaintiffs burden very
difficult as the plaintiff must not only disprove the defendant's articulated reason
for the plaintiffs termination, but also prove that discrimination was, in fact, the
real reason).
92. See Fischl, supra note 22, at 181-82 (noting that with subconscious discrimina-
tion, it is difficult to prove intent); Slater, supra note 2, at 56 n.14, 60 (citing
scholars who argue that the burden shifting framework does not uncover uncon-
scious bias); see also infra subsection IV.E.2 (recognizing the difficulty in proving
the defendant's motive).
93. See ESTLUND, supra note 91, at 151; Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Pro-
tections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1679 (1996) ("Those who fit
into one of the classes protected by antidiscrimination law-mainly women, mi-
norities, older, or handicapped workers-may consequently see and claim dis-
crimination when there is simple garden-variety unfairness."); Fischl, supra note
22, at 181-82 (noting the problem with trying to squeeze the square peg (unfair
termination) into the round hole (discrimination law)).
94. Even if a plaintiff did not initially think discrimination was at play, if she seeks
advice from a lawyer because the termination seems unfair, a lawyer will ask her
if she thinks the termination was discriminatory based on her sex, race, etc. She
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Accordingly, many terminated employees bring discrimination claims
regardless of whether there is any indication that discrimination was
the motivation behind the termination decision. 9 5
Nevertheless, establishing that plaintiffs likely bring many merit-
less discrimination lawsuits does not prove that this is a problem wor-
thy of a solution. It is also necessary to explore whether and why the
overuse of discrimination statutes is troubling. There are several con-
cerns with the proliferation of unsuccessful lawsuits. First, it is sim-
ply inefficient to waste time and resources litigating meritless
claims. 96 Second, employees who are white males, under the age of
forty, and able-bodied, are often left without a remedy, regardless of
the egregiousness of their termination. 97 While one might not have
much sympathy for the dominant race/sex of the world, I believe there
is an inherent injustice in white males not having a remedy for the
exact same termination decision that might give a woman and/or a
racial minority a remedy.98
Third, as Professor Cynthia Estlund has convincingly argued, the
at-will presumption (and its corresponding over-use of anti-discrimi-
nation statutes) causes employees to be pitted against one another.
White male employees recognize that the employer is more cautious
about terminating minority or female employees than them and is
likely to give minority employees more process before they are termi-
nated.99 Of course, this type of tension in the workplace benefits no
one. 10 0
very well might assume that it must have been discriminatory because she was
given no other rational reason for the termination. See Estlund, supra note 93, at
1679; see also Fischl, supra note 22, at 183 (arguing that many employees try to
use discrimination laws for unfair decisions).
95. See Estlund, supra note 93, at 1679; Fischl, supra note 22, at 181-82.
96. See ESTLUND, supra note 91, at 151 (noting how expensive and burdensome litiga-
tion is); Slater, supra note 2, at 71 (arguing that replacing at-will with just cause
would reduce the number of weak discrimination claims).
97. See Estlund, supra note 93, at 1680-81 (discussing how the at-will regime pro-
vides no protection to white males, who are often resentful of the "perceived" ad-
ditional protections women and/or minorities get).
98. To be clear, a white man could bring a race and/or sex discrimination claim under
Title VII, which protects white men as well as women and/or racial minorities.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). But in a
traditional workplace dominated by white men, such a claim is certain to fail, and
most white men would not bother bringing it in the first place.
99. See ESTLUND, supra note 91, at 151; Estlund, supra note 93, at 1681 ("Employees
who are not 'protected' by those laws may perceive fairness itself as a special
privilege from which they are excluded.").
100. Furthermore, as Richard Fischl points out, the at-will rule "racializes many em-
ployment disputes," and makes employers and the defense lawyers angry at liti-




Perhaps most importantly, the fourth concern I have with the
overuse of our discrimination laws is that there is some truth to the
assertion that employers are more cautious about firing women and/or
minority employees.l 0 ' This, in turn, leads to employers hiring more
white male employees because it will be easier to fire them if things do
not work out.' 0 2 Studies reveal that employees are much more likely
to bring discrimination claims at the firing stage rather than the hir-
ing stage. Accordingly, a rational employer armed with this knowl-
edge has an incentive to discriminate at the hiring stage to avoid
hiring the employees who will pose a litigation threat if they need to
be terminated down the road. l0 3 This, of course, is not the result that
our discrimination laws were intended to create,' 0 4 and thus, further
demonstrates why the employment at-will presumption is
problematic.
Finally, too many unsuccessful discrimination claims cause public
suspicion about the effectiveness and necessity of our anti-discrimina-
tion laws.' 0 5 Many people believe that sexism and racism are
problems of the past-not the present. This false belief might be
caused in part by the failure rates of these types of claims.
B. The Problem with Just Cause
If the at-will presumption is so troubling, then the logical solution
for many is the opposite of at-will-a just cause standard. Many
scholars have suggested that we get rid of our at-will presumption and
adopt a just cause standard. Under this standard, employees could
only be terminated by an employer for good cause-an amorphous
standard, but one that has served its purpose relatively well in differ-
ent contexts, including under collective bargaining agreements as well
101. See ESTLUND, supra note 91, at 152-53; Estlund, supra note 93, at 1679-80 (not-
ing that once an employer hires a member of the protected group, they should and
probably do take some defensive steps to prevent or defend litigation). As a prior
defense side employment lawyer, I know from experience that employers often
consider more carefully and offer larger severance packages to women and/or mi-
norities (as well as those over forty) than to white males under the age of forty.
102. See ESTLUND, supra note 91, at 152-53; Estlund, supra note 93, at 1680.
103. See Estlund, supra note 93, at 1680.
104. See Matthew J. Cleveland, Comment, Title VII and Negative Job References: Em-
ployees Find Safe Harbor in Robinson v. Shell Oil Company, 31 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 521, 525 (1998) ("The purpose behind Title VII was to 'eliminate ... discrim-
ination in employment based on race, color, religion, [sex], or national origin' and
to enhance the hiring opportunities of minorities 'on the basis of merit.'") (quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 914, at 11 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2355, 2401;
110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey)).
105. See Selmi, Hard to Win, supra note 90, at 556 (arguing that many erroneously
believe that discrimination cases are too easy to win and that courts perceive
Title VII claims as "generally unmeritorious, brought by whining plaintiffs").
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as the laws in many other countries, including Canada and most coun-
tries in Europe.10 6
Certainly, having a just cause standard would eliminate many dis-
crimination claims because employees would realize that even if the
termination was unfair and without cause, it was probably not dis-
criminatory and would, therefore, pursue the easier claim of proving
no cause. Furthermore, it is difficult to argue with the idea that em-
ployers should not make arbitrary, irrational termination deci-
sions.107 However, I believe just cause goes too far and would unduly
tie the hands of many employers who need to make employment deci-
sions motivated by sound management principles, not the fear of prov-
ing just cause.10 8 The problem with just cause is again a problem of
proof. Just as proving discrimination is often too difficult for employ-
ees, proving just cause is often too difficult for employers, 10 9 especially
when juries are more likely to side with employees than employers.
If the just cause standard were used, the decision-maker (juror,
judge, or arbitrator) would be inclined to second-guess the employer's
business decision. For instance, assume an employee is chronically
late, yet every tardy is accompanied with a good excuse. Perhaps one
day he has car trouble, and another day, the power goes out in his
house so that his alarm clock does not wake him in the morning. If
this employer has a strict attendance policy (perhaps six tardies or
absences in a year lead to termination), and the employee was termi-
nated pursuant to the attendance policy, the jurors are likely to ques-
tion why the employer needs to have such a strict attendance policy.
They also might be able to empathize with the tardy employee because
they can imagine such misfortunes happening to them. Accordingly,
jurors would be likely to reinstate the terminated employee because
they think the rule is unfair, even though the application of the rule
was fair and consistent. An arbitrator might similarly vitiate an em-
ployer's right to set its own business policies by considering the years
of service of the terminated employee and reinstating him if the arbi-
trator thinks that the punishment was too harsh for the offense.
106. See sources cited supra notes 8-15.
107. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 456-57 (arguing that arbitrary dismissals are so
unjust that they never should take place); cf Malin, supra note 5, at 137-38 (ar-
guing that the appeal for just cause has corrective justice components because
the employer has treated the employee unfairly and needs to correct it).
108. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 452, 454 (noting that the problem with just cause is
that the threat of litigation often limits the ability of employers to make efficient
and rational termination decisions).
109. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limit-
ing the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1427 (1967)
(addressing the problem of proof in cases turning on motive); Malin, supra note 5,
at 135 ("It is argued that, although employers generally do not dismiss employees
arbitrarily, they need the right to fire at-will because of the transaction costs and
proof difficulties that they would encounter under a just cause standard.").
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In fact, a review of arbitration cases reveals how often arbitrators
overturn a discharge because they believe the punishment was too
harsh. This in no way is intended to be a criticism of arbitration or
arbitrators. Analyzing arbitration cases is the easiest (albeit perhaps
not the most accurate) 1 o method of evaluating just cause in the
United States"'l because only collective bargaining agreements with
unionized employers routinely use the just cause standard.
In one arbitration case, the arbitrator held that there was no just
cause for terminating an employee who called his supervisor a "fuck-
ing bitch."112 The arbitrator reinstated the employee.11 3 This deci-
sion was primarily due to the arbitrator's belief that the penalty was
too severe because the employee hurled the insult to his supervisor
with his back turned to her.114
In another case, the arbitrator held that there was not just cause to
terminate a white employee who was harassing black co-workers by
putting a white cotton cloth over his face to appear like a Ku Klux
Klan member.115 Despite the employer's assertion that the employee
was aware of the anti-harassment policy and the employer's strong
interest in avoiding a harassment claim, the arbitrator reinstated the
discharged employee.116
110. The reason analyzing union cases might not be the most accurate method of eval-
uating just cause is because parties involved in union contract arbitrations have
developed a practice over the years that may or may not be indicative of practices
under a statute requiring just cause. For instance, it is common practice that
arbitrators who are deciding cases under collective bargaining agreements have
the authority to modify the discipline. If an employee is terminated, the arbitra-
tor can decide either to uphold the termination, to reinstate the employee with
full back pay, or anything in between. While this authority is not usually explic-
itly stated in collective bargaining agreements, it has become common practice
under most collective bargaining agreements. What is unclear is whether modi-
fying the discipline would become common practice if a statute (rather than a
contract) called for just cause. Perhaps this result could be avoided by limiting
the arbitrator's authority to an all or nothing decision-either the employee's ter-
mination is upheld or the employee is reinstated with full back pay. In any event,
I think the reader will agree that in most of the cases discussed below, termina-
tion should have been upheld, and even reinstatement without back pay and with
a long suspension is not a sufficient discipline.
111. One could also use international law as a comparison since many European coun-
tries have just cause as their default rule; however, this author is not an expert
on such laws.
112. Allied Aviation, LLP, Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport v. Transport Workers
Union, Air Transport Local 513, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1785, 1787 (2005)
(Jennings, Arb.).
113. Id. at 1792.
114. Id.
115. Atmos Energy Corp. v. International Chemical Workers Union Council of the
United Food and Commercial Workers Union Local 1047C, 121 Lab. Arb. Rep.




Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently up-
held an arbitrator's decision to reinstate an employee who was termi-
nated for sexually harassing a female employee.117 The arbitrator
found that the employee had engaged in sexually harassing conduct,
but that termination was not warranted because of the employee's
positive work record and potential for rehabilitation.11s Based on the
deference given to such arbitration decisions, the Tenth Circuit re-
fused to overturn the decision. 119 In my opinion, this decision is one of
the most troubling because it puts employers in a real quandary. If
the employer in this case had not fired the employee, the victim of the
harassment might have sued and would likely be able to prove that
the employer failed to take prompt remedial action.120 To avoid that
lawsuit, which would likely be very costly, the employer fired the har-
asser and then had to endure the time and expense of litigating the
discharge. Furthermore, what happens if the grievant harasses
again? Is a jury going to be sympathetic to an employer who know-
ingly reinstates a harasser, even when compelled to do so by an arbi-
trator? I am not sure of the answer to that question, but it seems to
me that it is a risk an employer should not have to take.
Another example of the just cause standard leading to the inability
of the employer to mete out appropriate discipline is a case where the
employer fired the employee for violating company policy by sending
sexually explicit material through the e-mail system. 12 1 As part of a
widespread investigation, the employer learned that the employee had
sent jokes of a sexual nature and emails with picture attachments
that the arbitrator considered to be of a pornographic nature.12 2 The
employee admitted some of the actions but lied when he alleged that
he had been unable to open the pictures and, therefore, was unaware
of their content.12 3 Despite the arbitrator's findings that the em-
ployee's actions violated the employer's sexual harassment policy and
117. LB & B Assocs. Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No.
113, 461 F.3d 1195, 1196 (10th Cir. 2006).
118. Id. at 1197.
119. Id. at 1197-98. When parties have entered into a contract agreeing to arbitra-
tion, the court's review of the arbitrator's decision is "among the narrowest
known to the law." Id. at 1197 (internal quotation and citations omitted). An
arbitrator's decision is entitled to "profound deference" as long as it "draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement." Id. (internal quotation and
citations omitted).
120. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (stating that "[flor sexual
harassment to be actionable, [the conduct] must be sufficiently severe or perva-
sive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment'").
121. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades, Local 579, 113
Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 833 (1999) (Dichter, Arb.).
122. Id. at 844.
123. Id. at 841.
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internet usage policy and that the employee's conduct was "extremely
serious," the arbitrator ultimately reinstated the employee because he
had been employed for nine years and had no active discipline in his
file.124 Even though the arbitrator realized the potential liability to
the employer if it did not take its harassment policy seriously, the ar-
bitrator, using the just cause provision in the collective bargaining
agreement, stepped into the employer's shoes to decide the appropri-
ate level of discipline. This is not a case of "he said/she said," where
the fact finder is unsure whether the misconduct took place. The em-
ployee in this case admitted to many of the facts, and the arbitrator
was certain he was lying about other facts yet still decided to reinstate
because of the grievant's past work history and the employer's disci-
pline of other employees in the past.12 5
In another case, an arbitrator reinstated an employee who was
guilty of both lying and cheating.12 6 In this case, the company had
given OSHA-mandated training tests to many hourly employees.12 7
After discovering widespread cheating on those tests, the employer
started over with the tests and issued a very stern warning to all of
the employees that anyone caught cheating on the tests would be ter-
minated. 128 Nevertheless, the grievant wrongfully obtained answers
to the test and apparently tried (unsuccessfully) to memorize the an-
swers.12 9 He also had "cheat sheets" of the answers in his shirt pocket
during the test.13 0 Upon being caught with these cheat sheets, the
grievant repeatedly lied to company management. 13 1 He finally came
clean during the arbitration hearing and admitted to both the cheat-
ing and the lies he had told to management. 132 Nevertheless, the ar-
bitrator found that because the grievant had been employed for
seventeen years and had never engaged in this type of offense before,
he should be reinstated without backpay.133 Interestingly, the arbi-
trator noted that the grievant was an employee "inclined to make mis-
takes" and was not the "most capable of employees," but because "the
Company has retained him for [seventeen] years,... he must be com-
124. Id. at 845 ("What grievant did was wrong and should never be allowed. However,
given what has gone before and what happened to others here, I cannot conclude
that grievant's acts were so much more serious than was done by any others as to
warrant his termination.").
125. Id.
126. Union Pac. Res. Co. v. Local 4-207, Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Interna-











petent enough."1 34 I find this very telling. The grievant had probably
been retained despite his shortcomings because he had never done an-
ything bad enough to warrant discharge under a just cause standard.
Even when he did something extremely egregious, he was still rein-
stated. This case perfectly exemplifies the problem with just cause.
Not only can an employer not terminate marginal employees, but ap-
parently it cannot even terminate liars and cheaters.
One final illustration of the problem with just cause is a case
where the employee, a UPS driver, was terminated for being under
the influence of alcohol while working and was reinstated by the arbi-
trator. 135 The employee was given a breathalyzer because his eyes
were bloodshot, he was disheveled, and there was a strong smell of
alcohol on his breath.136 Approximately two hours after his shift
started, the breathalyzer revealed a blood alcohol content of 0.056.137
Because the company's policy was unclear that a level of intoxication
below the criminal driving level would result in discharge, the arbitra-
tor reinstated the grievant. 138 This case, in my opinion, borders on
outrageous. To say that there is an appropriate level of alcohol in the
blood of a UPS driver is insane, especially given that 0.056 is quite
close to the illegal level in some states. It should not take any particu-
lar notice for a UPS driver to realize that any alcohol in his blood
could lead to a dangerous situation driving through the streets of
America. These arbitration cases represent only a small sampling of
cases where the just cause standard led to the interference with an
employer's sound business decision.139
Professor Julie Suk has revealed another justification for not using
a just cause standard-it may cause more discrimination in hiring de-
cisions.140 Suk analyzed the recent events in France to demonstrate
that just cause actually contributed to the high unemployment rate
among minority persons there. 14 1 Because terminating an employee,
even an unproductive or misbehaving employee, is so costly, employ-
ers are less likely to hire "risky" employees.142 She states, "The
134. Id.
135. United Parcel Serv. Inc. v. Local 710, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,




139. But see Slater, supra note 2, at 103 (citing statistics to the contrary). I do not
mean to suggest that the just cause system should not be used in collective bar-
gaining agreements. Those contracts would not be affected by this statute, nor
would individually negotiated employment contracts, such as those sometimes
given to high-level executives.
140. Suk, supra note 89.
141. Id. at 95 (stating that the job security laws in France have had a disproportionate
effect on racial minorities).
142. Id. at 97.
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French experience shows that a general limitation on employers' fir-
ing can magnify employers' tendencies to discriminate in hiring."143
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in addition to the above
problems with using the just cause standard, such a proposal would
not be politically feasible. Because most employers are aware of the
difficulty and resulting high cost of proving just cause, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, for legislation containing a just cause stan-
dard to ever be adopted. Accordingly, in my opinion, the just cause
standard does not provide the most sensible solution to the problems
with the at-will presumption.
IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY SOLUTION
This Article proposes a solution that attempts to find the middle
ground between the employer-friendly at-will presumption and the
employee-friendly just cause standard. In this part, I propose a statu-
tory enactment, the Employment Termination Equity Act ("ETEA"),
that would prohibit certain terminations. I quickly abandoned any at-
tempt to arrive at a one-size-fits-all standard 14 4 because it would have
been too amorphous to be of much use and would, therefore, increase
litigation.145 The ETEA, if enacted, should supersede wrongful dis-
charge claims146 and the breach of the implied covenant of good faith
doctrine as it relates to employment terminations, leaving only statu-
tory prohibitions already in place,147 as well as the unlawful termina-
tions in the proposed statute. The only common law exception to the
at-will presumption that would remain in place is the implied in fact
143. Id. at 107.
144. For instance, my initial thought was to suggest that the statute prohibit termina-
tions made in "bad faith." In other words, an employer could still terminate for
no reason and, of course, for good reason but could not terminate if the termina-
tion was deemed to have been made "in bad faith."
145. But see Blades, supra note 109, at 1432 (arguing that it is hard to include all
possible employer wrongs and thus proposing an inclusive, non-specific definition
of abusive discharges).
146. In this way, the ETEA is similar to the Model Employment Termination Act,
which also supersedes common law claims. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINA-
TION ACT § 2, 7A U.L.A. 310 (2002). I realize that this may be a very controver-
sial suggestion from the plaintiffs perspective. Wrongful discharge claims are
brought under tort law and, therefore, are subject to compensatory and punitive
damages if a violation of public policy is found. Because of the limitation on dam-
ages in this statute, see infra subsection IV.E.4, what may have been fertile
ground for large damages awards would now disappear under this statute. But,
because these cases are often the most unpredictable (caused by the variations in
state law), I believe it highly unlikely that employers would support this statute
if there still existed the possibility of run-away juries and enormous damages
awards.
147. This statute would operate as a floor. Accordingly, any statutory provision that




contract exception, where an employer has promised implicitly to em-
ploy the employee indefinitely unless the employer has just cause to
terminate.148 Because this claim is actually being brought on regular
contract principles rather than a departure from the at-will presump-
tion, this claim would still be available under the ETEA. In reality,
however, these claims are not very prevalent because employers are
more careful about not making long-term employment promises and
making sure their handbooks do not make promises that would give
way to an implied in fact contract.1 4 9
In determining which termination decisions are worthy of protec-
tion, I concentrated on two types of harm: (1) the harm to the human
dignity and autonomy of the terminated employee and (2) the harm to
the public if certain terminations were left unchecked. In many in-
stances, the latter category is covered by public policy claims, but the
inconsistency in the resolution of those claims is part of the problem
this proposal is intended to solve.15o Certainly, if the statute only
used the broad parameters of offending the human dignity or harming
the public, without specifying what types of terminations fall under
these broad categories, this statute would be very difficult to apply
and would greatly increase litigation. Thus, I begin with the discus-
sion of these categories not to define the standard but to give the
reader the broad theme by which I will classify many prohibited ter-
mination decisions.
The broad classification of "terminations that offend the human
dignity" encompasses terminations based on immutable characteris-
tics (such as race, sex, age, or physical impairment), the exercise of
fundamental rights, and the right to express oneself off-duty in a man-
ner that does not harm the employer. In fact, many of these rights can
be gleaned from rights found in the Amendments to the United States
Constitution: freedom of speech and association in the First Amend-
ment, the right to privacy in the Fourth Amendment, and the right to
equal protection in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Admit-
tedly, some of the prohibited terminations are painted with a broader
brush than the rights guaranteed under the Constitution, but they all
find their underpinnings in these very basic and fundamental rights.
As will be evident, there is some overlap between unlawful termi-
nations under the ETEA and other statutory laws. However, the
ETEA would not make those other statutes superfluous because, as
will be discussed below, the burden is easier under the ETEA. Yet, in
148. See supra section I.B.
149. See Slater, supra note 2, at 98 (arguing that "[the doctrine that employee manu-
als can become enforceable contracts . . . can easily be avoided by explicit dis-
claimers in the handbook").
150. See supra notes 54-58.
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the true spirit of compromise, the remedies available are less profita-
ble for plaintiffs.
A. Summary of Prohibited Terminations
This section will provide only a summary of the language of the
proposed statute so that the reader can quickly get a sense of what I
am attempting to accomplish. In the latter sections of this Part, I will
discuss in detail the rationale for including the various prohibited ter-
minations and how they would apply in certain circumstances. Under
the ETEA, the main prohibition section would read as follows:
It is unlawful for an employer to terminate an employee's employment if it
is proven 1 5 1 that the reason or rationale for the termination decision was
because of:
(1) An immutable characteristic of the employee that does not affect
the employee's ability to perform his job;
(2) The employee's exercise of a fundamental right that does not affect
the employee's ability to perform her job;
(3) Behavior or conduct the employee engaged in or is thought to en-
gage in while off-duty, which does not affect the employee's ability to per-
form the job, except that an employer can terminate an employee for off-
work illegal drug use or other off-duty conduct if, because of the em-
ployee's position, the off-duty conduct is likely to substantially harm the
reputation of the employer;
(4) An attendance violation when the absence triggering termination
was caused by the serious health condition of the employee or a serious
health condition or death of a member of the employee's immediate family,
except that the employee is only protected from termination under this
provision once per year, and the absence must not exceed two weeks in
length;
(5) The employee's complaint of conduct or behavior by another em-
ployee of the company that a reasonable person would consider offensive,
harassing, or discriminatory, provided that such complaint is made in a
reasonable manner that does not overly disrupt the workplace;
(6) The employee's refusal to engage in behavior that the employee rea-
sonably believes is offensive or morally wrong, when such refusal does not
harm the employer's legitimate business interests;
(7) The employee's refusal to engage in conduct that a reasonable per-
son could believe violates a federal or state law;
(8) The employee's status or potential status as a victim of a crime of
violence, unless the employer has a reasonable, fact-based, good-faith be-
lief that the employee's presence at work will likely lead to violence in the
workplace, and there are no reasonable measures that can be taken to
mitigate the threat of violence;
(9) The employee's disclosure that the employee has information or a
reasonable belief that the employer or an employee of the employer has
violated, is violating, or will violate local, state, or federal statutes pro-
vided that the disclosure is made to the employer or a representative of
the employer whom the employee reasonably believes is in a managerial
151. The statute would have a different burden of proof scheme than other employ-
ment discrimination statutes. See infra subsection IV.E.2.
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or supervisory position, and has the authority to investigate the informa-
tion provided by the employee and to take action to prevent further viola-
tions of the state's statutes, or the complaint is made to an employee of a
public body or political subdivision of the state or any agency of a public
body or political subdivision; or
(10) The employee's engagement in any of the following:
a) Exercise of rights under the workers compensation statutes of
the state,
b) Service on a jury, or
c) Exercise of voting rights.
B. Terminations that Offend the Human Dignity
Prohibited reasons one through six can be said to offend the human
dignity either because they involve the termination of an employee for
behavior or factors over which he has no control or because they in-
volve an employee's behavior that our society deems worthy of protec-
tion. Below each prohibition, I will discuss the rationale for including
the prohibition and how it should be applied in certain circumstances.
1. Immutable Characteristics
An immutable characteristic of the employee that does not affect the
employee's ability to perform his job.
This is perhaps the easiest to defend for inclusion in this statute
because our federal government, as well as most state governments,
has already chosen to prohibit employment terminations based on cat-
egories that are considered immutable. This provision would include
terminations based on race, sex, color, national origin, ethnicity, age,
or physical impairments. Despite the fact that all of these are in-
cluded as protected classifications under various federal and state
laws-Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,152 the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 153 and the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act ("ADA")154-this statute would not make the others
superfluous because it would provide coverage to individuals when
those statutes fail to do so.
First, consider "physical impairments." Under the ADA, an indi-
vidual must prove that he not only has a physical impairment, but
that the impairment causes a substantial limitation on one or more
"major life activities."155 Imagine that an employee is in a car acci-
dent that causes a permanent facial deformity. Assume the employer
terminates him because the owner finds his appearance repulsive.
Under the ADA, he likely would not be considered an individual with
a disability if his facial deformity does not interfere with any major
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
153. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000).
154. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2000).
155. Id. § 12102(2) (2000).
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life activities like seeing, hearing, eating, thinking, etc.156 This stat-
ute would step in to provide such an individual with a remedy for this
wrongful termination. There are many physical impairments that are
not considered disabilities under the ADA, yet are the reason an em-
ployer chooses to terminate an employee. 15 7
The rationale for including the other immutable characteristics
(sex, race, national origin, age, color) even though they are covered by
other statutes is because of the difficulty plaintiffs have in proving
these claims.158 Because this statute would utilize a different burden
of proof than what is used in Title VII discrimination cases, 15 9 this
statute should provide protection when Title VII or its state
equivalent does not.
The language in the statute, "that does not affect the employee's
ability to perform his or her job," provides a defense to employers if
they can prove that an employee's immutable characteristic does af-
fect the employee's ability to perform his or her job. This defense is
similar to the bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ") defense in
the Title VII context, where an employer can avoid liability for inten-
tional discrimination if the employer can prove that the employee be-
ing one sex over the other (as an example) is necessary for the
156. Id. ("The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual-(A) a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activi-
ties of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment."). Some might think he would have a claim under
the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability; however, in order to prove
that the employer "regarded" a person as disabled, the plaintiff must prove that
the employer believed that the impairment caused a substantial limitation on a
major life activity. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999).
If the impairment was (as in the example) a facial deformity that caused no limi-
tation, but rather, only offended the employer, a plaintiff would have difficulty
succeeding under this theory. See Talanda v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co., 140 F.3d
1090, 1097-98 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91 ("[An em-
ployer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical conditions that do
not rise to the level of an impairment.., are preferable to others, just as it is free
to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make
individuals less than ideally suited for a job.").
157. Furthermore, it is possible a court might hold that a facial deformity is not even
an impairment, so impairment needs to be broadly defined to include all medical
conditions, regardless of whether they result in a loss of function: 'A physical or
mental impairment means an illness or injury, including anatomical loss, physio-
logical or psychological disorders, mental illness, and cosmetic disfigurement." PE-
TER BLANCK, EvE HILL, CHARLES D. SIEGAL, & MICHAEL WATERSTONE, DISABILITY
CIL RIGHTS LAW & POLICY § 3.2 (2004) (emphasis added) (citing 28 C.F.R.
§ 36.104 (2003); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2003)).
158. See infra subsection IV.E.2; see also Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the
Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to "No Cause" Em-
ployment, 81 TEx. L. REV. 1177, 1237-38 (2003) (examining employer deference
and Title VII exceptions to employment at-will); Selmi, Hard to Win, supra note
90, at 562-69 (same).
159. See infra subsection IV.E.2.
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employee's performance of some job criteria that is necessary for the
job.160 In the Title VII context, this is an affirmative defense that has
to be proven by the employer and has been very narrowly interpreted
by the courts. 16 1 It would also be an affirmative defense under this
statute and should be narrowly construed.
2. Exercise of a Fundamental Right
The employee's exercise of a fundamental right that does not affect
the employee's ability to perform her job.
The term "fundamental right" in this provision refers to things the
U.S. Supreme Court has classified as such. These include the decision
of whether to marry,16 2 the decision of whether to have children, 163 a
person's religious practice, 16 4 and decisions regarding a person's re-
160. The BFOQ defense, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000), states: "[I]t shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employ-
ees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain in-
stances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular bus-
iness or enterprise . . . ." See also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37
(1977) (holding that the employer was justified under BFOQ defense when it pre-
vented the employment of women in a contact position at a dangerous, male max-
imum security prison). Race, however, is never subject to the BFOQ defense.
King v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990)
(stating that race is never a BFOQ for a job). It should similarly not be the basis
for a BFOQ defense under the ETEA.
161. See, e.g., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333; Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78
F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the BFOQ defense was very narrow).
For instance, it is no defense under Title VII to claim that customers prefer one
sex over another except in very limited circumstances. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, 289 (1988). Similarly, it would not be a defense
under the ETEA to allege that customers prefer workers of a particular race, etc.
162. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the right to marry is a
fundamental right). Other authors have argued in favor of protecting employees
from marital status discrimination; see, e.g., Anna M. DePalo, Antifraternizing
Policies and At-Will Employment: Counseling for a Better Relationship, 1996
ANN. SURV. Am. L. 59 (arguing that, absent a conflict of interest, an employer
should not be able to terminate an employee because of a romantic relationship
the employee has with a co-worker or employees of a competitor or customer);
Barbara M. Albert, Note, The Combined Effect of No-Spouse Rules and At-Will
Doctrines on Two-Career Families Where Both Spouses Are in the Same Field, 36
BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 251 (1997) (suggesting that spouses could successfully work
together, as long as the company has established some safeguards). I have also
argued that marital status should be a protected category under Title VII.
Porter, Marital Status Discrimination, supra note 58.
163. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that the right to have chil-
dren is a fundamental right).
164. Religion is a protected category under Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
Accordingly, it is unlikely a plaintiff who feels she has been discriminated against
because of her religion will need to resort to the ETEA, unless of course, she
prefers to take advantage of the easier burden of proof under the ETEA. See
School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221-23 (1963) (stating
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production.16 5 The types of terminations intended to be prohibited
under this provision include termination because an employee chooses
to have an abortion,16 6 termination because an employee gets preg-
nant and has the child out of wedlock,167 and termination because of
an employee's marital status. 168 Because neither marital status nor
family status is a protected category under federal law16 9 and only
some states protect an employee from being terminated because of her
marital status or decision whether to have children,170 this statute
would prohibit an employer from interfering with an employee's deci-
sions in an area that is extremely personal and private. Only when
employees' exercise of one of these fundamental rights makes them
that the government is prohibited from interfering with or attempting to regulate
any citizen's religious beliefs, from coercing a citizen to affirm beliefs repugnant
to his or her religion or conscience, and from directly penalizing or discriminating
against a citizen for holding beliefs contrary to those held by anyone else).
165. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that a woman has a limited right
to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy).
166. See Amador v. Tan, 855 S.W.2d 131, 133-34 (Tex. App. 1993) (refusing to create a
new exception to the employment at-will doctrine when plaintiff was terminated
after she counseled co-worker to have an abortion).
167. See, e.g., Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1987)
(affirming the district court's decision to dismiss the claims of an unmarried preg-
nant staff member of a private social club for girls who was discharged under the
club's "negative role model" policy prohibiting continued employment of unmar-
ried staff members who either became pregnant or caused pregnancy); Cooper v.
Mower County Soc. Servs., 434 N.W.2d 494, 495 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (stating
that plaintiff was not hired for a position because she was unmarried and preg-
nant); Ganzy v. Allen Christian Sch., 995 F. Supp. 340, 344 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (not-
ing the fact that an unmarried pregnant school teacher was fired from a church
affiliated school).
168. For cases discussing such terminations, see Johnson v. Porter Farms, Inc., 382
N.W.2d 543, 552 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding damages award for termina-
tion of employee who lived with his girlfriend and their child on the farm at
which he was employed and was told by the employer to either marry his girl-
friend or he would be terminated); Frankel v. Warwick Hotel, 881 F. Supp. 183,
185 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (upholding plaintiffs termination when he was terminated
for refusing to divorce his wife because his father/boss disapproved of her relig-
ion). See also Matthew W. Finkin, Life Away from Work, 66 LA. L. REV. 945,
969-70 (2006) [hereinafter Finkin, Life Away from Work] (arguing that an em-
ployee's extra-marital affair is none of the employer's business).
169. As stated earlier, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimination
based on race, color, sex, religion, and national origin but does not protect against
discrimination based on marital or family status. Porter, Marital Status Dis-
crimination, supra note 58, at 7.
170. As of 2004, twenty-two states and the District of Columbia protect against mari-
tal status discrimination. Gina Capua, Marital Status Discrimination: The Sta-
tus/Conduct Debate, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 961, 962 n.8 (2004) (listing the states, as
of 2004, that protect against marital status discrimination); see Phillips v. Martin
Marietta, 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (holding that a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the distinction between a woman's family obligations re-
garding children, as compared to a man's family obligations with children, was a
bona fide occupational qualification).
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unable to perform their job would an employer be justified in termi-
nating their employment.1 7 1 Many employers (non-religious entities)
terminate employees not because the employee's exercise of a funda-
mental right interferes with the employee's job but because the em-
ployer finds the conduct morally repugnant. 17 2 Our society's strong
interest in our right to privacy demands that non-religious employers
should not be making these decisions for their employees.
3. Off-Duty Conduct
Behavior or conduct the employee engaged in or is thought to en-
gage in while off-duty, which does not affect the employee's ability to
perform the job, except that an employer can terminate an employee for
off-work illegal drug use or other off-duty conduct if, because of the
employee's position, the off-duty conduct is likely to substantially harm
the reputation of the employer.
There has been a great deal of discussion regarding protection of
an employee's private life.173 While a thorough examination of this
171. Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad., 450 F.3d 130, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (noting where
former teacher at a private Catholic school alleged that her termination after
signing a pro-choice advertisement in a local newspaper constituted retaliation
for protected speech and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII and Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act). Even if an employer can prove that the employee's
exercise of the fundamental right (i.e., having a child out of wedlock) interferes
with the employee's ability to perform her job (perhaps because she is a teacher in
a Catholic school), it would also need to prove that it would have made the same
decision for a male employee who has a child out of wedlock. See Grayson v.
Wickes Corp., 607 F.2d 1194, 1196-97 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that district court
did not use an improper standard under equal employment provision by requir-
ing plaintiff, who was terminated because she was an unwed mother, to show
that unmarried male employees who fathered children out of wedlock would be
treated differently by defendant employer).
172. See, e.g., Beecham v. Henderson County, 422 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2005) (up-
holding plaintiffs termination from at-will employment with Henderson County
because her intimate association with a married man was disruptive to the work-
place in which she and the wife both worked); Veenstra v. Washtenaw Country
Club, 645 N.W.2d 643, 644 (Mich. 2002) (noting country club's former employee
brought breach of contract and marital discrimination claims against club alleg-
ing that the club refused to renew his employment contract following his notori-
ous and public separation with his wife and cohabitation with another woman);
Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 475 A.2d 618, 622 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1984) (remanding for trial plaintiffs claim that he was discharged because he
was a married man who had a sexual liaison with a woman other than his wife);
Hudson v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 725 N.Y.S.2d 318, 319 (App. Div. 2001) (em-
ployee discharged for having an extramarital affair with a co-worker).
173. See Blades, supra note 109, at 1413, 1422-23 (arguing for a tort remedy for an
abusive discharge when an employer fires an employee for conduct of the em-
ployee that bears no relationship to the employer); Malin, supra note 5, at 131
(noting that a corrective justice approach to at-will should justify a legally en-
forceable limitation to an employer's power to control an employee's private life
that has nothing to do with her job); Michael Selmi, Privacy for the Working
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debate is beyond the scope of this Article, I will attempt to briefly out-
line the debate, where I fall in the debate, and why I chose to prohibit
termination decisions that may be based on "lifestyle decisions."
Professor Matthew Finkin has written extensively on the topic of
protecting an employee's right to a life away from work.174 Summa-
rizing his position, he believes that the at-will presumption allows for
an unwarranted interference by employers in their employees' private
lives.175 Some states are in agreement with this position and have
passed laws referred to as "lifestyle discrimination statutes" or "lawful
activity laws." For instance, more than half of the states prohibit an
employer from interfering with an employee's consumption of lawful
products. 176 New York has legislation allowing an employee to en-
gage in recreational activities, and California, Colorado, and North
Dakota prohibit an employer from interfering with an employee's
right to engage in any lawful activity. 177 Finkin believes that these
state statutes do not go far enough because they only protect employ-
ees in particular states and do not always define with specificity what
behavior is protected.1 7 8 This leaves courts free to infringe upon an
employee's right to live his life how he chooses, without fear of inter-
ference from the employer. 179
On the other side of the debate are strict adherents to employment
at-will, who believe that any interference with an employer's preroga-
tive to terminate its employees for any reason not already prohibited
by law is undue interference.18 0 While these critics do not believe that
all off-duty conduct will harm the employer's business interests, they
are worried about the possibility of such a negative effect and presum-
Class: Public Work and Private Lives, 66 LA. L. REV. 1035 (2006) [hereinafter
Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class]; sources cited infra note 176.
174. See, e.g., MATTHEW FINKIN, PRIVACY IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 368-69 (2d ed. 2003);
Finkin, Life Away From Work, supra note 168; Matthew Finkin, Employee Pri-
vacy and the "Theory of the Firm," 26 J. LAB. RES. 711 (2005); Matthew W.
Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
221, 246-47, 249-51 (1996).
175. See generally sources cited supra note 174.
176. Finkin, Life Away from Work, supra note 168, at 946; see also Rives, supra note
87, at 556-63 (addressing the established and emerging trends among states re-
garding the protection of employees' off-duty conduct).
177. Finkin, Life Away From Work, supra note 168, at 946.
178. See id.
179. See Rives, supra note 87, at 554 (arguing for a federal statute that would "protect
an employee's right to engage in lawful recreational activities as well as an em-
ployee's right to lawfully use lawful products during nonworking hours.").
180. See Finkin, Life Away from Work, supra note 168 (discussing at length the cri-
tique of lifestyle laws and lawful consumption laws by Robert Howie and Lau-
rence Shapero, in Lifestyle Discrimination Statutes: A Dangerous Erosion of At-
Will Employment, a Passing Fad, or Both?, 31 EMP. REL. L.J. 21 (2005)).
[Vol. 87:62
THE PERFECT COMPROMISE
ably want to preempt the harm that could come from some employees'
off-duty behavior.181
I believe that the burden should be on the employer to prove that
an employee's off-duty behavior harms the employer's interests,I8 2
and I am also not convinced that all prohibitions on off-duty behavior
are caused by an employer's fear of the effect on the employer's busi-
ness.18 3 Rather, I believe many employer prohibitions are caused by
an overly controlling supervisor or manager, perhaps one whose limi-
tations on a productive employee for personal reasons are subverting,
not serving the company's interests.' 8 4
The ETEA would prohibit an employer from terminating employ-
ees because of off-duty behavior or conduct or suspected behavior or
conduct, unless such behavior interferes with the employer's legiti-
mate business interests. This statute is intended to protect off-duty
behavior such as: (1) an employee's political activities;' 8 5 (2) an em-
ployee's use of lawful consumable products while not working and off
the employer's premises, unless the employee is still under the effect
of such consumable products when he returns to work;' 8 6 (3) an em-
ployee's recreational activities during non-working hours;1 8 7 and (4)
an employee's personal relationships with others, romantic or pla-
181. Id. at 948-49 (citing Howie and Shapero, supra note 180); see Selmi, Privacy for
the Working Class, supra note 173, at 1051 (arguing that it is difficult to reconcile
workplace privacy with at-will employment relationships).
182. See Finkin, Life Away from Work, supra note 168, at 969 (stating that political
speech must be shown to have a "concrete impact" on the employer's interests).
183. Cf. Selmi, Privacy for the Working Class, supra note 173, at 1047 (arguing that an
employee's home life should remain private, even if they are using company prop-
erty at home, such as a computer); iq. at 1053 (arguing that courts should allow
tort claims for terminations because of off-duty conduct and the employers should
have to prove it had a compelling justification).
184. Cf Finkin, Life Away from Work, supra note 168, at 969-70 (giving examples of
situations where the employer objects to the employee's off-duty conduct for
moral reasons).
185. See, e.g., Finkin, Life Away from Work, supra note 168, at 968 (arguing that polit-
ical speech outside of work should be protected); Rives, supra note 87, at 564
(suggesting such a prohibition in her proposed federal lifestyle discrimination
statute).
186. Rives also suggests this prohibition as do some state statutes; however, I think it
is not clear in her language that it is not permissible for an employee to come into
work while under the influence of alcohol, even though the use of that alcohol
while off work would be protected. See Rives, supra note 87, at 564. This provi-
sion also raises some employer concerns over costs of health care. For instance,
some employers prohibit smoking by employees because of the increased health
care costs. This statute would prohibit termination for smoking but would not
interfere with other employer programs aimed at reducing healthcare costs
caused by smoking.
187. See Rives, supra note 87, at 565. This, of course, is meant to prohibit an employer
from terminating an employee because of their recreational activities. As stated
earlier, employers might choose such an action because of the fear of increased
health care costs. See Finkin, Life Away from Work, supra note 168, at 960-61.
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tonic, including those with non-supervisory co-employees, except that
an employer may have a policy of prohibiting romantic relationships
between co-employees if they work in the same department at roughly
the same hours of the day.' 8 8 If the employer had such a policy and
found that two employees in the same department were dating one
another, the preferred solution to this problem would be to ask the
couple to choose which one of them would be willing to transfer to an-
other department or shift, rather than simply terminating the offend-
ing couple.
This prohibition would also cover the situation where an employer
terminated an employee because of his or her sexual orientation. Ob-
viously, this is a hotly contested area, and there does not appear to be
enough public support for an anti-discrimination law (such as Title
VII) to protect employees against discrimination based on their sexual
orientation.' 8 9 However, the ETEA is not an employment discrimina-
188. See Finkin, Life Away from Work, supra note 168, at 965. Ann Rives' Note sug-
gests protection for an individual's personal relationships but does not allow for
any exception. Rives, supra note 87, at 565. I think romantic relationships at
work can cause serious problems, and they certainly should be precluded com-
pletely between supervisors and their direct subordinates because of the per-
ceived or real favoritism and because of the harassment suit that would
inevitably follow if and when the relationship ends. See ESTLUND, supra note 91,
at 159 (stating that employers' policies that prohibit relations between employees
and those they supervise are sensible). I would support employers' policies that
precluded any person in a managerial or supervisory role from dating anyone
who does not have the same level of authority and responsibility in the company.
Even if the employee does not directly report to the supervisor, the concerns of
perceived favoritism are likely to still exist. Even between two employees who
are not in a reporting relationship with one another, a romantic relationship at
work causes problems for many employers. The employees might offend other
employees if they are acting inappropriately in the workplace, or other employees
might feel that the couple is not pulling their weight if they are overly wrapped
up in their personal relationship. Finally, and most importantly, the employer is
rightfully concerned with the possible harassment issues if the couple splits. Cer-
tainly, it is possible for one employee to harass another employee who works in a
different department, but it is less likely to be as severe or pervasive as it would
be if the employees are working side by side. For a discussion of some of these
issues, see Porter, Marital Status Discrimination, supra note 58, at 46-47 (argu-
ing that even though an employer should not refuse to hire or terminate an em-
ployee because of a no-spouse rule, there are some romantic relationships in the
workplace that should be prohibited); see also Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Love at
Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 237, 248-49 (2006) (recognizing that while
employers face too many restrictions on relationships and marriage at work, not
allowing these employees to supervise one another makes sense).
189. See GEORGE A. RUTHERGLEN & JOHN J. DONOHUE III, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINA-
TION: LAw & THEORY 364 (2005).
Title VII has been uniformly interpreted to prohibit only discrimination
on the basis of sex, not on the basis of sexual orientation. And, in fact,
bills to amend Title VII to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation have been introduced in Congress but have not been passed
by either house.
THE PERFECT COMPROMISE
tion statute. It would not force employers to hire gay and lesbian em-
ployees' 90 but would only preclude employers from firing an employee
when the reason for such termination is the off-duty, lawful,191 con-
sensual relationship that the employee has with another person, re-
gardless of that other person's sex. Just as the Supreme Court has
said that the government does not belong intruding upon peoples'
right to privacy in their own homes (unless their activities are crimi-
nal offenses such as drug activity or some violent crime), employers
also should not be able to intrude upon their employees' right to pri-
vacy unless that behavior adversely affects the employer. With re-
spect to an employee's sexual orientation, it would seem that there
would be very few circumstances where that employee's behavior
would negatively affect the employer.
4. FMLA Expansion
An attendance violation when the absence triggering termination
was caused by the serious health condition of the employee or a serious
health condition or death of a member of the employee's immediate
family, except that the employee is only protected from termination
under this provision once per year, and the absence must not exceed
two weeks in length.
Terminations because of absences are exceedingly common. Many
of those absences are caused by an employee's own illness or injury or
the illness or injury of the employee's family members. Some employ-
ees are terminated for absences caused by the death of a loved one.
This statute would protect an employee from being fired for attending
to the death of a loved one. It would also cover those situations that
may not be covered by the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA")192 be-
Id. (citations omitted); see also MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY 156-57 (2d ed. 2003) ("The courts have generally held that the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit classifi-
cations based on sexual orientation. Nor has Title VII or its state counterparts
been interpreted to provide protection against discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation, even when the discriminatory acts are explit and intentional.").
190. From the plaintiffs perspective, that is perhaps one of the ETEA's biggest faults.
It only covers termination decisions. See infra subsection IV.E.6.b. For the re-
cord, I am in favor of a Title VII prohibition against discrimination based on sex-
ual orientation, but this argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
191. Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 559 (2003),
an employer in some states could argue that if the employee is engaging in sod-
omy, such behavior is criminal. In Lawrence, however, the Supreme Court held
that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to en-
gage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as it applied to
adult males engaging in the consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of their
home. Id. at 579-80. After Lawrence, a state is prohibited from having statutes
making sodomy or other private sexual behavior between two persons illegal. Id.
192. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
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cause the employer does not have enough employees, or the employee
has not been working long enough to be covered by the FMLA.193 Cer-
tainly, this statute does not provide nearly as much protection as the
FMLA, so it would only be used if the employee could not invoke
FMLA protection.
5. Retaliation
The employee's complaint of conduct or behavior by another em-
ployee of the company that a reasonable person would consider offen-
sive, harassing, or discriminatory, provided that such complaint is
made in a reasonable manner that does not overly disrupt the
workplace.
This prohibition overlaps with the anti-retaliation provisions in
many of our civil rights statutes, including Title VII,19 4 the ADEA, 195
and the ADA,196 among others. The retaliation literature has dis-
cussed that one of the most pressing problems with the anti-retalia-
tion doctrine under Title VII is that a plaintiff needs to prove that she
had a reasonable belief that the behavior she opposed was discrimina-
tory.19 7 The problem with this rule is obvious. How are non-lawyers
supposed to know what constitutes illegal discrimination? Many peo-
ple have no idea which characteristics are protected or when harass-
ment has reached the pervasive level.198 In most workplaces, most
employees do not know when offensive conduct violates the law. 19 9
For instance, assume an overweight person is constantly harassed
and teased about her weight. If she complains about it, she could be
fired without recourse because a court would likely hold that she does
not have a reasonable belief that being overweight is a protected class
193. The FMLA covers employers with fifty or more employees within a seventy-five
mile radius and only protects employees who have worked for the employer for
one year. See, e.g., Calloway v. Univ. of Louisville, No. Civ.A. 3:04CV389-S., slip
op. at 1 (W.D. Ky. May 25, 2006) (upholding employer's denial of the plaintiffs
request for paid leave under the FMLA because she was not employed for the
requisite twelve months); Astrowsky v. First Portland Mortgage Corp., 887 F.
Supp. 332, 335 (D. Me. 1995) (holding that because the employer only employed
nine or ten employees, it is not an employer for purposes of the FMLA); Tronetti
v. TLC HealthNet Lakeshore Hosp., No. 03-CV-0375E(SC), 2003 WL 22757935,
at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2003) (holding that plaintiff failed to allege that the
employer employed a sufficient number of employees to be within the meaning of
the FMLA); Samadder v. DMF of Ohio, Inc., 798 N.E.2d 1141, 1155 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that appellant only employed by employer for ten months is
not an eligible employee under the FMLA).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
195. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (2000).
196. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
197. See Brake, supra note 73, at 23, 76.
198. Id. at 80, 82, 93, 99-101.
199. Id. at 87-89.
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even if she sincerely believes that it is (or should be) a protected
class.20 0 Another reason retaliation cases are dismissed is because
the plaintiff cannot prove that she had a reasonable belief that harass-
ing behavior had reached the level of being severe or pervasive to
qualify as illegal harassment. 20 1 In these cases, the employee com-
plains to management because a co-employee or supervisor had made
an offensive comment, and she is subsequently terminated for com-
plaining. Her retaliation claim will likely fail because a court will
hold that she did not have a reasonable belief that one offensive com-
ment constituted illegal harassment.
Consider this real-life example. The plaintiff complained of a ra-
cially offensive comment and was subsequently fired.20 2 The com-
ment came when the news broke in October 2002 that police in
Maryland had captured two black men suspected of being the snipers
who had randomly shot and killed several individuals.2 03 One of
plaintiffs co-workers was watching the coverage on television and
stated, "They should put those two black monkeys in a cage with a
bunch of black apes and let the apes f-k them."2 04 The plaintiff, who
is black, was offended and reported the comment to management. 2 0 5
Management fired the complaining employee. 20 6 The court affirmed
the district court's opinion dismissing the case, stating that no reason-
able person could have believed that the single offensive comment cre-
ated a hostile work environment.2 07 I agree with the court that one
racist comment does not create a hostile environment, but how is a
non-lawyer supposed to know or understand that harassment needs to
be severe or pervasive before a person can legally complain about it
and be free from retaliation? Perhaps more importantly, is it not com-
pletely reasonable for an employee in the plaintiffs shoes to want to
complain about such an offensive racist comment? Employers often
encourage such early reporting of harassing comments and behavior;
allowing these employers to terminate employees because of com-
plaints they encouraged seems egregiously unfair. If our retaliation
laws do not protect such early disclosures of offensive behavior, at
least this statute will.
200. See EEOC v. Watkins Motor Lines, Inc., 463 F.3d 436, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2006)
(noting that obesity, without more, is not a disability); Nedder v. Rivier Coll., 944
F. Supp. 111, 118 (D.N.H. 1996) (finding that plaintiff failed to show that her
obesity substantially limited her ability to work).
201. See Brake, supra note 73, at 80, 82, 93, 99-101.
202. See Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006)
203. Id. at 336.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 337.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 341.
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Furthermore, in cases where an employee is complaining of offen-
sive behavior directed at others, this statute would protect this valua-
ble behavior. In Wimmer v. Suffolk County Police Department,208 a
police officer filed a discrimination claim under Title VII alleging that
he was wrongfully terminated for complaining about the discrimina-
tory treatment of minority non-employees by his co-workers. The
court held that the officer's retaliation claim was "not cognizable
under Title VII because his opposition was not directed at an unlawful
employment practice of his employer" and noted that because Wimmer
did not introduce evidence that minority employees of the Department
felt that they worked in a racially hostile environment, Wimmer could
not reasonably have believed that he was protesting an unlawful hos-
tile work environment.20 9 Other scholars have argued that employees
who complain in these circumstances deserve to be protected from dis-
crimination.2 10 Professor Brake, for instance, argues that it is helpful
to have persons outside the protected class challenge the discrimina-
tion because they are less likely to be perceived as overreacting or self-
interested. 21 1 Professor Estlund has also discussed the value of "in-
tergroup amity and empathy."2 12 Estlund described a case where sev-
eral white male police officers joined together to demand that their
supervisor, who was racially and sexually abusive, be disciplined. 2 13
Their decision to stand up for their co-workers led to the employer's
harassment, threat to discharge them, and other retaliatory ac-
tions. 2 14 Their subsequent lawsuit was dismissed. 2 15 As Estlund
stated, "Nothing could be more at odds with the vision of workplace
cooperation and solidarity . "216
This statute would also change the result of the case discussed ear-
lier 2 17 where the plaintiff alleged he was fired for stating, "Blacks
have rights too."218 The court criticized the plaintiffs "sickly" protest
because he did not make a more formal complaint to his boss.219 Con-
trary to that court's opinion, I do not think retaliation protection
should be based on the bravado of the plaintiff. There are many rea-
sons why an employee in the plaintiffs position may have been unwill-
208. 176 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 1999).
209. Id. at 135-36.
210. See, e.g., Brake, supra note 73, at 98 (stating that the law should protect those
who complain of discrimination even if they are not the targets).
211. Id. at 72.





217. Bigelow v. Bullard, 901 P.2d 630 (Nev. 1995); see supra notes 64-73 (discussing
this case).
218. Bigelow, 901 P.2d at 632.
219. Id. at 634 n.4.
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ing to formally protest his employer's discriminatory practices against
potential customers-the most notable (and obvious) being fear for his
job. As long as the plaintiff does not spend her day complaining con-
stantly in a loud, disruptive fashion, the complaint should be pro-
tected, provided it is regarding behavior of another employee or agent
of the company that a reasonable person would find offensive, harass-
ing, or discriminatory.
6. Refusal to Engage in Offensive Behavior
The employee's refusal to engage in behavior that the employee rea-
sonably believes is offensive or morally wrong, when such refusal does
not harm the employer's legitimate business interests.
This would protect an employee's desire to avoid behavior that the
employee reasonably finds offensive. As an example, in one Arizona
case,
2 20 the plaintiff was allegedly fired because she refused her su-
pervisor's request during a rafting trip to engage in public nudity by
participating in a skit where they all had to "moon" the audience. 22 1
The court in that case held that because the mooning skit could possi-
bly be a violation of a public nudity statute, she had a public policy
claim, 2 2 2 but even if the behavior was not arguably illegal (and in fact
would likely never be prosecuted), she still should have the right not
to be fired for refusing to engage in behavior that she finds offensive,
demeaning, or morally reprehensible.
This provision inevitably implicates the debate over "conscience"
clauses-statutes that allow healthcare workers to refuse to treat a
patient in a way they find amoral2 23 or allow a pharmacist to refuse to
dispense contraceptives because he objects on moral or religious
grounds.224 While some authors object to these conscience clauses be-
cause they erode employment at-will, 22 5 one need not dive into this
debate for purposes of this Article's proposed statute because this pro-
vision is not as broad as the typical conscience clause. One problem
with conscience clauses is that they directly implicate an employee's
main job duties-usually the provision of medical services. In fact,
one of the main criticisms of conscience clauses is that they are abso-
lute-they protect an employee even if he refuses to perform the most
220. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc) su-
perseded by statute Employment Protection Act, 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 683 (codi-
fied as amended at ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1501 to 1502 (West Supp. 2007).
221. Wagenseller, 710 P.2d at 1029.
222. Id. at 1035.
223. While these used to be limited to the refusal to participate in an abortion, it has
been broadened to include all medical services. James A. Sonne, Firing Thoreau:
Conscience and At-Will Employment, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 235, 240 (2007).
224. Id. at 236-37.
225. See, e.g., id. at 238.
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essential function of his job.226 This provision of the ETEA explicitly
states that the employee is only protected if his failure to perform the
requested task does not affect the business interests of the employer.
Certainly, an employee's refusal to perform a job function would affect
the employer's business interests. Instead, this provision is meant to
protect extracurricular activities, 227 like the mooning skit in the Ari-
zona case.
C. Terminations that Harm the Public's Interest
1. Refusal to Commit a Crime
The employee's refusal to engage in conduct that a reasonable per-
son could believe violates a federal or state law.
Under current law, the employment at-will doctrine has been sub-
ject to a public policy exception if an employee's termination is be-
cause the employee refuses to commit or participate in an illegal or
wrongful act. 228 While some courts require that the act must actually
be illegal for an employee to claim retaliatory discharge, other courts
only requre the employee to reasonably believe that the act is illegal to
sustain a claim for retaliatory discharge. 22 9 Because courts have been
inconsistent in applying this exception and because this statute would
226. Id. at 284.
227. See id. at 278 (arguing that public policy claims based on conscience objections
are different than typical conscience clauses because they involve behavior other
than the essential functions of the job).
228. See, e.g., Negron v. Caleb Brett U.S.A., Inc., 212 F.3d 666, 670 (1st Cir. 2000)
(holding that discharge was actionable when a chemist repeatedly refused to
make illegal changes to laboratory results and certificates that would have jeop-
ardized her chemist's license); Haney v. Aramark Unif. Servs., Inc., 17 Cal. Rptr.
3d 336, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that an employee's allegations that he
was terminated for complaining about and refusing to participate in the em-
ployer's fraudulent billing practices were sufficient to state a claim for retaliatory
discharge in violation of public policy); Allum v. Valley Bank of Nev., 970 P.2d
1062, 1066-67 (Nev. 1998) (stating that discharge was actionable when the em-
ployee refused to become involved in making loans that violated Federal Housing
Administration regulations).
229. See, e.g., Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F.3d 321, 332 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying
Pennsylvania law, the court held that an at-will employee does not state a recog-
nizable claim of wrongful discharge when his termination is based on a disagree-
ment with management about the legality of a proposed course of action unless
the action the employer wants the employee to take actually violates the law).
But see Dunn v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car Co., 170 S.W.3d 1, 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)
(holding that it was not necessary for a terminated employee to "allege or prove
conclusively the law ha[d] been violated" in order to state a claim for wrongful
discharge under the public policy exception to employment at-will when he rea-
sonably believed his conduct was illegal or against a clear directive of public pol-
icy (citation omitted)); Gabler v. Holder & Smith, Inc., 11 P.3d 1269, 1277-78
(Okla. Civ. App. 2000) (holding the discharge was actionable when the employee
refused to produce university parking passes without the university's permission,
which the employee believed (falsely) to be illegal).
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supersede the violation of public policy claim, protection is warranted
here.
2. Domestic Violence Victim
The employee's status or potential status as a victim of a crime of
violence, unless the employer has a reasonable, fact-based, good-faith
belief that the employee's presence at work will likely lead to violence in
the workplace and there are no reasonable measures that can be taken
to mitigate the threat of violence.
This, of course, is meant to cover the situation where employees
are terminated for being victims of domestic violence, and these termi-
nations happen more often than most people realize. 230 Employers
terminate victims of domestic violence for many reasons. Sometimes,
the employee is terminated because of absenteeism or productivity is-
sues.2 3 1 Sometimes, the victim is terminated because of an employer's
visceral reaction against domestic violence victims. In my experience,
the victim is often terminated because the employer fears that the vic-
tim's abuser will come into the workplace to harm the victim or others,
and the employer is unwilling to deal with that risk.2 32 While it is
true that sometimes there is a real and substantial risk that the
abuser will harm his victim or others in the workplace,233 I believe
many employers jump to that conclusion rather hastily without thor-
oughly analyzing the situation.234 For instance, in Green v. Bry-
ant,2 35 discussed supra section III.A, the plaintiffs employer fired her
almost immediately after she told her employer that she had been
beaten and raped by her estranged husband. 236 Even if the reason for
her termination was the fear of violence in the workplace, it is not
clear from the facts of the case that the employer did any investigation
at all. Instead, as in many cases, the employer just assumed that the
victim's estranged husband posed a threat to the workplace and it
fired her to get rid of the threat.23 7 I believe such terminations are
230. See Porter, Victimizing the Abused, supra note 78, at 287 (noting that thirty per-
cent of domestic violence victims lost their job because of the problems associated
with the violence).
231. See id. at 287 (pointing out that businesses lose $100 million annually in lost
wages, absenteeism, and non-productivity because of domestic violence).
232. See generally id. at 278-79.
233. Id. at 288 (giving examples of an abuse victim's ex-boyfriend killing her at work
and the owner of a company being shot in the face when an employee's former
boyfriend showed up at work and killed her and one other employee who at-
tempted to intervene).
234. See id. at 328.
235. 887 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
236. Id. at 800; see supra notes 74-79 (for a discussion of this case).
237. Green, 887 F. Supp. at 800 n.2. It is not clear from the facts of the case that the
employer fired her because of the risk. It is possible that the employer fired her
just because it did not like the stigma associated with domestic violence or be-
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offensive to not only the employee's dignity2 3S but are also harmful to
the public's interest because the public has an interest in preventing
the harm caused by domestic violence and the harm caused by termi-
nating a victim of domestic violence.2 39
However, as I have argued elsewhere, it is not always safe or sensi-
ble to keep an employee who is the victim of domestic violence if there
is a serious threat that violence will ensue, and no reasonable mea-
sure can be taken to mitigate the harm. 240 There are certain situa-
tions where it is impracticable for an employer to retain an employee
when the risk of violence is so great.2 4 1 Unless an employer takes on
the astronomical expense of a locked down building with around-the-
clock security, the only reasonable solution may be termination. 24 2
cause it assumed she would be unable to continue to carry out her duties if she
was suffering from abuse. In my opinion, both of those latter reasons would actu-
ally be more egregious than terminating her because of the potential risk to the
workplace.
238. In fact, this provision could have just as easily been placed with the provisions
concerning the dignity of the employee. Many believe such actions by employers
are a form of sex discrimination, and although I find support in such a proposi-
tion, I believe this claim is better situated as one that harms the public because
the public has an interest in eliminating the harm associated with terminating
the victim of domestic violence.
239. See Porter, Victimizing the Abused, supra note 78, at 321.
The public has an interest in employers addressing domestic violence
.... [Olne can see how failing to address workplace domestic violence
may force more women out of the workforce, thus increasing the demand
for public assistance and social services. Firing the victims would also
harm the public's interest .... By depriving or preventing women from
achieving the economic independence needed to leave their batterers,
employers may unknowingly force victims back into their abusers' lives,
thereby perpetuating the cycle of violence .... [E]mployers have a pub-
lic interest obligation to assist victims of domestic abuse because "abuse
perpetuates the societal subordination and objectification of women."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jill C. Robertson, Addressing Domestic Violence
in the Workplace: An Employer's Responsibility, 16 LAW & INEQ. 633, 654 (1998)).
240. Id. at 327-28.
241. Imagine this scenario: the employer finds out that the employee is being abused
by an intimate partner. It discovers that the abuser has a history of violence,
involving victims other than those with whom he is in a relationship, and he has
made threats to the employee that he will kill her. He also owns a gun. The
employer offers its assistance to help her leave him and get her to safety, includ-
ing finding a shelter, providing a paid leave of absence, and/or transferring her to
an out-of-state location. She not only refuses all such help but also tells the em-
ployer that she will stay with him, and when asked to keep them apprised if he
makes any threats involving the workplace again, she flatly refuses. Under these
facts, an employer would be foolish to not fire the victim. It could be liable in tort
law if it refused to fire her and her abuser harmed somebody in the workplace.
Porter, Victimizing the Abused, supra note 78, at 327 n.11.




Having said that, most abusers do not pose a significant threat to
the victim's workplace. Most abusers are violent to only their loved
ones and are not threatening to others outside of their intimate rela-
tionships.2 43 Furthermore, most abusers like to keep their violent re-
lationships private. 244 Accordingly, because the threat of violence is
uncertain at worst, and unlikely at best, I have recommended else-
where that employers borrow from the law of the ADA and use a "di-
rect threat" analysis to determine if the employee's abuser poses a
serious threat to the workplace.245 In other words, an employer
should not terminate a domestic violence victim unless it has deter-
mined that there is a serious and imminent threat to the workplace if
it continues to employ the victim, and the employer cannot mitigate
the risk of harm by offering the victim reasonable accommodations
that do not pose an undue hardship on the employer. 24 6
3. Whistleblower
The employee's disclosure that the employee has information or a
reasonable belief that the employer or an employee of the employer has
violated, is violating, or will violate local, state, or federal statutes pro-
vided that the disclosure is made to the employer or a representative of
the employer whom the employee reasonably believes is in a manage-
rial or supervisory position, and has the authority to investigate the
information provided by the employee and to take action to prevent fur-
ther violations of the state's statutes or the complaint is made to an
employee of a public body or political subdivision of the state or any
agency of a public body or political subdivision.24 7
In legal, academic, and business circles, the topic of whistleblowing
has received heightened attention because of corporate scandal and
the need for employee protection. 248 Some state legislatures have en-
243. Id. at 327 n.312 ("In general ... most abusers are not violent to anyone besides
their loved ones, as ironic as that seems.").
244. Id. at 329 (citation omitted).
245. Id. at 328-30. A direct threat analysis under the ADA requires looking at the
four following factors: (1) the duration of the risk; (2) the likelihood that the po-
tential harm will occur; (3) the nature and severity of the potential harm; and (4)
the imminence of the potential harm. Id. at 329.
246. Id. at 328-30.
247. The wording of this statute is derived in large part from an Arizona statute, ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1501 (West 2007), which codified the public policy claims
and prohibited discharge for specific reasons. The Arizona statute is helpful be-
cause it eliminated some of the confusion in that state as to what is or is not
covered, but it mainly prohibited terminations that would arguably be covered by
the public policy claims. My goal is broader.
248. See Frank J. Cavico, Private Sector Whistleblowing and the Employment-At-Will
Doctrine: A Comparative Legal, Ethical, and Pragmatic Analysis, 45 S. TEX. L.
REV. 543 (2004); Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the Dark? Corporate Fraud,
Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the Sabranes-Oxley Act for Employment
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acted private sector whistleblowing statutes enabling employees to
bring a cause of action when they are terminated for "blowing the
whistle" on illegal business activities that are contrary to public
policy.249
Accordingly, this prohibition would protect employees who report
illegal behavior of the employer or its employees, like in the Foley case
where a bank employee reported that his supervisor was being inves-
tigated for embezzlement from his former employer. 2 5o In that case,
the court held that the behavior was not protected because reporting
the prior criminal activity by the supervisor only benefited the com-
pany and not the public at large. 25 1 I think this is a ridiculous distinc-
tion. Foley reported the information regarding the embezzlement
investigation of the supervisor because he thought his employer would
want such information. He should not be punished for misunder-
standing his employer's ethics in this regard. The other distinction
sometimes made by courts is that employees are only protected if they
report to a public agency but not if they report misconduct internally
within the company.2 52 This statute is intended to cover both situa-
tions because both situations represent behavior that should be en-
couraged, rather than discouraged.
4. Civil Rights and Duties
The employee's engagement in any of the following:
a) Exercise of rights under the worker's compensation statutes
of the state;25 3
Law, 79 WASH L. REV. 1029 (2004); Noah P. Peeters, Don't Raise That Hand:
Why, Under Georgia's Anti-Slapp Statute, Whistleblowers Should Find Protection
from Reprisals for Reporting Employer Misconduct, 38 GA. L. REV. 769 (2004).
249. See Cavico, supra note 248, at 547; see also Massingale, supra note 20, at 194 ("A
number of states recognize an employee's right of action for wrongful discharge
under the whistleblowers exception. These states have recognized the desirabil-
ity of protecting workers who are willing to speak out against dangerous condi-
tions and illegal activity carried on by co-workers or employers.") (footnote
omitted).
250. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 375 (Cal. 1988); see Linzer, supra
note 23, at 382-83 (suggesting a balancing test to address competing factors at
play in a whistleblower case to determine if discharged employee was wrongfully
terminated).
251. Foley, 765 P.2d at 380.
252. See Slater, supra note 2, at 97.
253. See, e.g., Tony v. Elkhart County, 851 N.E.2d 1032, 1040 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(recognizing that worker's compensation statute created a public policy in favor of
an employee filing a worker's compensation claim, and employee had a cause of
action for retaliatory discharge); Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464
N.W.2d 682, 684-85 (Iowa 1990) (recognizing that an employee can bring a cause




b) Service on a jury; or 254
c) Exercise of voting rights.25 5
This last set of prohibitions is derived from public policy claims
and in fact, is the one area that most state courts would agree should
be protected by public policy claims.256 However, because states vary
in their approach to these claims and because the ETEA would pre-
empt any state public policy claims, they need to be included here.
D. State vs. Federal
A statute's substantive provisions are only as good as the proce-
dures for enforcing them. In deciding on the procedures for this stat-
ute, I first needed to decide whether the proposed statute should be a
model for states to adopt if they so choose, or a proposal for a federal
statute. This decision involved several considerations. Having a fed-
eral statute would greatly increase consistency between states. Na-
tionwide companies would benefit from this consistency because they
could have standardized rules.2 57 Furthermore, a federal statute
would eliminate states having to compete for an employer's busi-
ness.258 The Model Employment Termination Act, as a model for
states to adopt, was not at all successful. Accordingly, because the
problems with at-will employment cannot be solved if few or no states
adopt the ETEA, it should be a federal statute.
One concern with a federal statute is whether state employees
could sue their employers for money damages. This is a question of
254. See Call v. Scott Brass Inc., 553 N.E.2d 1225, 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (at-will
employee was terminated because the employee complied with the statutory duty
to appear for jury service); see also Massingale, supra note 20, at 192 (stating that
courts have protected rights conferred on employees by statute and discussing
the decision ofNees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975), whereby "an employee was
discharged for serving on a jury over the employer's objections" and the court
"reasoned that not only had the plaintiffs individual statutory rights been in-
fringed, but the termination also violated community purpose and societal
interest").
255. See, e.g., Gill v. Farm-Bureau Life Ins. Co. of Mo., 715 F. Supp. 945,945 (E.D. Mo.
1989) (employee discharged for supporting political candidate); MacDougall v.
Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 164 (N.J. 1996) (plaintiff terminated as a sales person for
real estate firm when he voted, as a member of a local municipal governing coun-
sel, for a parking ordinance opposed by a client of the real estate firm).
256. These provisions are also derived from the Arizona statute, ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-1501 (West 2007), and would likely be covered by many states' judicially
derived public policy claims.
257. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 305, introductory cmt.
(2002); Rives, supra note 87, at 564 (noting that it is difficult for multi-state em-
ployers to fashion consistent rules when state law varies so much between
states).
258. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 305, introductory cmt.
(2002); see also McGinley, supra note 9, at 1508 (suggesting that individual states
compete with one another to attract business).
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constitutional law, specifically, Eleventh Amendment immunity.
While a detailed analysis is beyond the scope of this Article, it is likely
that the current Supreme Court would find that this statute does not
abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity,259 which means
public employees would not be able to sue their state employers for
money damages. However, protecting public employees is not as ur-
gent as protecting private employees because public employees are not
employees of multi-state employers, and many are subject to civil ser-
vice rules that offer protection against termination. 260
E. Procedural Matters
1. Unique Procedural Mechanism: Choose Your Statute
As will be discussed later, one of the most significant criticisms
this proposal will likely receive is the assertion that it will be too ex-
pensive for employers and will interfere with their ability to run their
businesses as they see fit. These concerns will be addressed in more
259. The Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution precludes individu-
als from suing states in federal court without the state's consent. The Amend-
ment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any For-
eign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI. There are several exceptions to the Elev-
enth Amendment immunity doctrine; one is that Congress can abrogate the
states' sovereign immunity if it made its intention to do so very clear in the lan-
guage of the statute and the law abrogating the states' immunity must have been
adopted pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than Con-
gress' Article I powers. CHRISTOPHER N. MAY & ALLAN IDES, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW: NATIONAL POWER AND FEDERALISM 177 (4th ed. 2007). The first require-
ment could be easily met by clearly stating in the ETEA that Congress intends to
abrogate states' immunity and allow individuals to sue state employers for money
damages alleging a violation of the ETEA. However, the second requirement is
not so easily met. It is not enough for Congress to state that it is enacting the
ETEA pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 178-79.
"[T]he abrogation must be both 'congruent' and 'proportional' to the actual viola-
tion of judicially recognized Fourteenth Amendment [Section] 1 rights." Id. at
179. In other words, "Congress must identify a pattern of state violations of a
judicially recognized constitutional right, create a statute that is plainly designed
to ameliorate the violation of those constitutional rights, and devise a remedy
that is tailored to the demonstrated pattern of state-induced constitutional viola-
tions." Id. Because the prohibitions in my proposed statute vary greatly and be-
cause many of them do not prohibit behavior that would be seen as an equal
protection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, I think it unlikely that a
federal court would find that Congress had properly abrogated a state's Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Accordingly, the ETEA would likely not be enforceable
against a state employer in a suit for money damages.
260. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT Act § 1 cmt. at 309 (2002) (explaining
why the definition of employer in that statute can exclude public employers);
Slater, supra note 2, at 30 (noting that the majority of public employees are
covered by just cause rules).
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detail below.2 6 1 If, in fact, this statute became one more claim for
plaintiffs to add to their complaints, the financial concerns of employ-
ers would be legitimate. To address this concern, this proposal pro-
tects the interests of employers through a unique procedural
mechanism utilized by this statute. The ETEA requires the plaintiff
to choose between a suit under this statute and other statutory claims.
After the close of discovery, the plaintiff would be forced to dismiss
either her claim under the ETEA or her other statutory claim(s).
There are two justifications for employing this procedural require-
ment in the statute. First, the purpose of the ETEA is not to give
employees an additional cause of action to challenge an unfair termi-
nation; the purpose is to give employees a cause of action when they
otherwise would not have one. Accordingly, this statute is not meant
to take the place of Title VII or other federal or state statutes that give
employees the right to sue for an unlawful termination. In this way,
this proposal differs from other proposals that recommend a national
statute that abolishes Title VII and other employment discrimination
statutes.26 2 If an employee, through discovery, has uncovered decent
evidence that the decision to terminate her was discriminatory, she
does and should have a good chance of succeeding in her discrimina-
tion claim, and she should drop her claim under the ETEA and pursue
the claim that provides the fullest panoply of remedies.
If, however, discovery reveals that the reason the employer has
given for her termination is likely untrue or is egregious enough to fall
into one of the prohibited categories of terminations 26 3 but there is no
evidence of discrimination, the plaintiff should drop her discrimina-
tion or other claims, and pursue the ETEA claim. She will not be enti-
tled to as much in damages, but if she was likely going to lose her
discrimination case anyway, she would be better off pursuing the
ETEA claim. I realize that this decision is not always going to be easy
for plaintiffs and their attorneys to make. Most plaintiffs do not have
a crystal ball to determine what a jury might do with either/any of the
claims the plaintiff has brought. Nevertheless, after discovery is com-
pleted, most plaintiffs do know what documents exist, what various
witnesses would say, and the quality and credibility of their testi-
mony. Most attorneys know when they have a strong discrimination
case and when they should settle. Here, they have a third option-to
pursue a claim under the ETEA if there is evidence that the termina-
tion decision might fall into one of the prohibited categories or if the
employer's stated reason for termination seems suspicious.
261. See infra section V.A.
262. See McGinley, supra note 9.
263. Obviously, it is this author's hope that simply having these prohibitions in place
would go a long way toward stopping these kinds of terminations.
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The other reason this procedural requirement is necessary is be-
cause it gives employers something in return for the discretion and
freedom it takes away from them by prohibiting certain terminations
that might not otherwise be prohibited. As the law stands right now,
when a terminated employee brings a discrimination claim or a
wrongful discharge claim, employers are often left with the risk of
(sometimes unlimited) compensatory and punitive damages.2 64 As
discussed below, this statute does not allow for compensatory or puni-
tive damages; accordingly, if an employee chooses the ETEA claim
rather than the discrimination claim, the employer can usually deter-
mine with a fair amount of certainty how much liability it faces if it
loses the lawsuit. The fear of sympathetic judges or juries is gone.
Therefore, with the choose your statute provision, the employer might
have to defend more lawsuits initially, but those lawsuits carry a
much smaller risk of liability than do discrimination or public policy
claims.
2. A Word About Burdens
As stated in the Introduction, one of the goals of this proposal was
to provide some overlap protection with discrimination statutes al-
ready on the books by using a procedural process that will be more
easily accessible to employees. The reason such protection is needed
lies in the difficulty of proving discrimination.265 In most cases, a
plaintiff needs to prove that the employer's intent was to discriminate
based on one of the protected categories. 266 The Supreme Court made
264. A plaintiff can sue his/her employer under federal, state, and even some local
anti-discrimination statutes. Stephen Befort, Demystifying Federal Labor and
Employment Law Preemption, 13 LAB. LAW. 429, 440-41 (1998). Therefore, the
plaintiff may be subject to a damage cap under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000) but can recover additional amounts under a
state statute where the cap is much higher or even unlimited. See, e.g., CAL.
GOV'T. CODE § 12965(c)(3) (West 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, § 9
(West 2007); Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 827 (8th Cir. 2004) (Iowa
Civil Rights Act allows for uncapped compensatory damages); Gagliardo v. Con-
naught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 572 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating there is no cap on
damages under the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act). It is not uncommon to
hear of multi-million dollar damage awards in employment discrimination cases.
See, e.g., Anchorwoman Wins $8.3 Million Over Sex Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
1999, at B1. Furthermore, because this statute would supersede the public policy
claims, the potential for large damage awards under those claims would also be
eliminated. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 303, introduc-
tory cmt. (2002) (indicating under current law, jury awards exceeding $1 million
dollars have been common).
265. See Fischl, supra note 22, at 183-84 (arguing that the burdens of proof make it
difficult to prove discrimination in part because it is hard to prove intent to
discriminate).
266. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 670 (1989) ('In a disparate-
treatment case [of employment discrimination,] there is no 'discrimination'
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this burden even more onerous when it decided St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks.267
In Hicks, a long-time employee made out a prima facie case of race
discrimination, alleging that he was fired by a new boss because of his
race. 2 68 The employer defended by stating the firing was for perform-
ance problems, shifting the burden back to the plaintiff to prove that
the employer's reason was simply a pretext for discrimination.269 The
district court held that even though the plaintiff proved that the de-
fendant's articulated reason of poor performance was false, the district
court did not think that discrimination was the reason that motivated
the defendant. 2 70 Instead, the court believed that the plaintiffs su-
pervisor was motivated by personal animosity toward the plaintiff.271
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision, stating that it
is not enough that the plaintiff prove that the defendant's reason was
false; he also must prove that discrimination was the real reason. 27 2
Of course, both the district court and the Supreme Court failed to ac-
knowledge or realize that the personal animosity of the supervisor
might have been caused by racial prejudice. 273
One of the biggest criticisms of the Hicks decision was that it seem-
ingly allowed, and perhaps even encouraged, an employer to lie about
the reason it terminated an employee.274 The decision also made the
plaintiffs burden very difficult. The plaintiff must not simply dis-
prove the defendant's articulated reason for the termination; she must
also prove that discrimination was the real reason. 27 5 As the dissent
pointed out in Hicks, this involves disproving all other possible rea-
within the meaning of Title VII unless the employer intentionally treated the
employee unfairly because of race."); Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487
U.S. 977, 985-86 (1988) ("[Wlhen an individual alleges that an employer has
treated that particular person less favorably than others because of the plaintiffs
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . the plaintiff is required to prove
that the defendant had a discriminatory intent or motive.").
267. 509 U.S. 502 (1993); ESTLUND, supra note 91, at 150 ("In the typical Title VII
case, the plaintiff must prove not simply that the decision against him or her was
not justified, but that it was motivated by race or sex.").
268. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 504-06.
269. Id. at 507-08.
270. Id. at 508.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 514-15.
273. Id. at 542-43 (Souter, J., dissenting).
274. Id. at 539-40 (Souter, J., dissenting); Slater, supra note 2, at 63 n.51 (citing au-
thors that criticized Hicks). Of course, employers should and usually do attempt
to put their best defense forward and, therefore, have an interest in presenting a
defense that they can prove. But when a supervisor takes matters into his own
hands and terminates without a good reason, the Hicks precedent allows employ-
ers to fabricate a reason for the termination if they think that giving the real
reason will not be well received by the court or the jury.
275. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 514-15.
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sons, even if those reasons were never clearly articulated by the defen-
dant but rather were only alluded to in the record. 2 76 Other scholars
have argued that this difficulty in proving the defendant's motive re-
sults in many unsuccessful claims. 2 77 Accordingly, to make my pro-
posed statute more accessible for plaintiffs and as a quid pro quo for
giving up their right to sue under other statutes, this statute's burden
of proof varies from that under Title VII and most other anti-discrimi-
nation statutes.278
Under this statute, initially the plaintiff only would have to allege
that she was terminated. 2 79 The employer would then have the bur-
den of coming forward with its reason for termination. Finally, the
plaintiff will have the burden of proving that the employer's reason is
pretextual. 28 0 Unlike discrimination law, however, if the employee
proves pretext, then it is assumed that the employer's real reason
must have violated the statute and, therefore, the plaintiff would win.
In this way, employers cannot avoid liability by alleging false rea-
276. Id. at 534-35 (Souter, J., dissenting).
277. See, e.g., Slater, supra note 2, at 58-59 (arguing that it is difficult for a plaintiff to
disprove all of the employer's possible reasons).
278. Many states have their own anti-discrimination statutes, but most of them, as
well as other federal anti-discrimination statutes (such as the ADEA and the
ADA), follow Title VII procedural law. See, e.g., State v. Comm'n on Human
Rights & Opportunities, 559 A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Conn. 1989); Hac v. Univ. of
Haw., 73 P.3d 46, 55 (Haw. 2003); Lavani v. Ill. Human Rights Comm'n, 755
N.E.2d 51, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001); Ind. Dep't. of Envtl. Mgmt. v. West, 838 N.E.2d
408, 413 (Ind. 2005); Bd. of Supervisors of Buchanan County v. Iowa Civil Rights
Comm'n, 584 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Iowa 1998); Ortega v. IBP, Inc., 874 P.2d 1188,
1196 (Kan. 1994); Venable v. Gen. Motors Corp., 656 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2002).
279. Admittedly, this is a very easy burden for the plaintiff to meet. I considered re-
quiring the plaintiff to state the alleged reason for the termination, but in most
cases, the plaintiff does not know the reason. Most employees who are termi-
nated and feel the termination was unfair do not know the specific reason for the
termination. Furthermore, I think the employer should have to play its cards
first. It did the terminating-it should be able to give a reason without having its
reason influenced by what the plaintiff believes is the possible reason for the dis-
charge. Cf. McGinley, supra note 9, at 1513 (stating that the employer should
have the burden of persuasion under her proposed statute because the employer
has exclusive control over the information regarding termination). The statute
would also allow a plaintiff to sue if she quit as long as she can meet the construc-
tive discharge test. See infra subsection IV.E.6.b.
280. The statute should also contain a "mixed-motive" provision based on Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000). That Section
provides that remedies are limited to injunctive relief and attorneys' fees, but not
reinstatement and back pay damages, if the employer can prove that despite its
illegal motive, it would have made the same decision to terminate even absent
the unlawful motive. The Model Employment Termination Act contains a similar
mixed-motive instruction. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 6(f), 7A
U.L.A. 318 (2002).
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sons.2 8  They are forced to give the true reason for the
termination.28 2
3. Notice Provision
The ETEA should require an employee, within a reasonable time
period after termination (perhaps six months), to inform her employer
of her intent to sue under the statute. The employer would then be
required (within thirty days) to provide in writing28 3 the reason(s) for
the employee's termination as well as any supporting documentation,
including anything from the employee's personnel file that would be
used to support the termination decision. 28 4 In this way, employers
are given the chance early-on to question the decisions made by their
supervisors and managers and can remedy an unwarranted termina-
tion if it is discovered that the manager or supervisor acted in his or
her own interests rather than the best interests of the company. Em-
281. See Slater, supra note 2, at 64 (stating "it seems fair that a party loses if it lies in
litigation about its act that harmed another party.").
282. In cases where the defendant is motivated by personal animosity, as in Hicks, the
employer has a choice. It can either admit that reason and deal with the poten-
tial backlash of the jury, who is unlikely to be sympathetic to an employer who
allows its supervisors to vent their personal animosity on their subordinates,
RUTHERGLEN & DONAHUE, supra note 189, at 85, or it can fabricate a reason and
pay the consequences if the jury does not believe the fabricated reason. See St.
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 537 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It
may indeed be true that such employers have nondiscriminatory reasons for their
actions but ones so shameful that they wish to conceal them.").
283. There are several issues that arise regarding the written notice that the employer
would be required to provide. One issue is the effect the writing would have on
subsequent litigation. Would this writing be admissible in court? Certainly, if
the employer has not changed the reason (which occasionally does happen legiti-
mately if the company does not have very good oversight over supervisory termi-
nation decisions), the employer would be well served by admitting the writing
into evidence itself. But if the employer has changed its reason because it learns
that the initial, hastily given explanation (often without a lawyer's advice and
without much research into the facts of the discharge) is not the real reason the
plaintiff was fired, can that document be used against the employer? If so, will
forcing the employer to turn over such a document be a pointless exercise because
many employers would be tempted to use vague language that could be later
adapted to suit many different possible explanations for the termination? If this
happened, then the notice provision would not serve a very useful purpose. Re-
gardless of the ultimate answers to these questions, I remain committed to the
idea that employers and employees are better served if they learn early on the
reason for a termination decision. As always, the "devil is in the details" but
diving into those details is beyond the scope of this Article.
284. This notice provision finds support from a couple of places. First, the Model Em-
ployment Termination Act also requires an employer to give written notice of the
reasons for termination. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 5(b), 7A
U.L.A. 316 (2002). Some states have similar notice provisions. For instance, Mis-
souri has a statute requiring employers to provide a letter to a discharged em-
ployee (upon the employee's request) explaining what reason the employer had
for discharging the employee. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 209.140 (West 2008).
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ployees benefit from this notice provision because it might induce rein-
statement and/or settlement, and they learn very early-on (before the
expense of discovery) the alleged reason for the termination. Some-
times, this is all employees want-an explanation. It might also be
helpful to include a grace period whereby no damages would be al-
lowed if an employer offers unconditional reinstatement within thirty
days of the notice to sue.
4. Remedies
This statute is not intended to supersede other statutory claims
(including discrimination claims); rather, the purpose of the ETEA is
to give terminated employees something akin to a breach of contract
action using this statutory procedure. The ETEA is also intended to
be a compromise statute because it would be, in today's political cli-
mate, close to impossible for a plaintiff-friendly statute to see the light
of day. For these reasons, the remedies provided by the ETEA are not
as broad as the remedies available under other statutory claims or
under wrongful discharge common law claims. For purposes of this
Article, I use Title VII as the primary comparator, but certainly there
are other statutes that provide broad remedies, including the ADEA,
the ADA, state anti-discrimination statutes, as well as countless
others.
Under Title VII, possible remedies include reinstatement with ret-
roactive seniority, back pay, injunctive relief, compensatory damages
(for pain and suffering), and sometimes punitive damages. 28 5 For
some claims brought under Title VII, compensatory and punitive dam-
ages are capped according to the size of the employer but cannot ex-
ceed $300,000.286 Under some state anti-discrimination statutes, the
compensatory and punitive damages are not limited at all. 28 7 Simi-
larly, under state wrongful discharge claims based on public policy vi-
olations, damages for compensatory and punitive damages are
unlimited.
In contrast, the remedies available under the ETEA would be lim-
ited to the types of damages a party can ordinarily be awarded in a
breach of contract action. These damages are frequently described as
"expectation damages," the goal of which is to place the injured party
285. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(a) (2000) (allowing for compensatory and punitive damages).
286. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (2000).
287. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT. CODE § 12965(c)(3) (West 2008); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
151B § 9 (West 2007); Baker v. John Morrell & Co., 382 F.3d 816, 827 (8th Cir.
2004) (noting that the Iowa Civil Rights Act has no cap on damages); Gagliardo v.
Connaught Labs., Inc., 311 F.3d 565, 572 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that there is no




in the place he would have been had the contract been performed in
full.288 If an employee is terminated, expectation damages would seek
to put the employee in the position he would have been in had he not
been terminated. This would include reinstatement, back pay dam-
ages awarded from the time of termination until the time of judgment
(reduced by any amount the plaintiff earned or could have earned
through reasonable efforts), and possibly front pay if the court deter-
mines that the terminated employee legitimately could not find work
and may not be able to for some time in the future.289
While attorneys' fees are ordinarily unavailable in a breach of con-
tract action, 290 they should be recoverable if a plaintiff prevails in an
action under the ETEA. Because the statute does not provide for com-
pensatory or punitive damages, plaintiffs' attorneys would likely not
take cases on a contingency basis because the amount of recovery is
likely to be small.29 1 This would result in those in need of representa-
tion the most, the rank and file employees who are unlikely to be able
to afford an attorney out of pocket, being unable to get representa-
tion.2 92 This is also true, of course, with breach of contract cases, but
the ETEA claims involve more of a public interest element, which jus-
tifies treating them differently. Accordingly, the ETEA should provide
for attorneys' fees to plaintiffs who prevail.
5. Forum: Arbitration vs. Courts
Most proposals to change or eliminate the at-will presumption sug-
gest that the adjudication of claims should take place by arbitra-
tors. 29 3 The reason for this suggestion is both obvious and compelling.
Labor arbitrators have been deciding discharge cases under collective
bargaining agreements for decades and are, thus, very familiar with
the "just cause" standard. Furthermore, arbitrators recently have be-
gun adjudicating cases that are claiming a statutory violation rather
than a violation of a collective bargaining agreement. 29 4 As a compro-
288. FARNSWORTH, supra note 20, § 12.8, at 758.
289. The Model Employment Termination Act limits front pay damages to a maximum
of thirty-six months, MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION Act § 7(a)(3), 7A U.L.A.
319 (2002), which seems a reasonable limit.
290. CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 962 (3d ed. 1993).
291. See Fischl, supra note 22, at 203 (arguing that most discrimination suits are
brought on contingency fee arrangements).
292. See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT, 7A U.L.A. 303, introductory cmt.
(2002) (explaining that attorneys fees are needed under that statute because oth-
erwise most rank and file employees could not find representation).
293. E.g., St. Antoine, supra note 9, at 77-78; McGinely, supra note 9, at 1510-11;
McGowan, supra note 9, at 183.
294. Some employers have begun requiring employees to sign agreements to arbitrate
all disputes arising out of the employment relationship. Because these employers
do not usually have just cause contracts with these employees, the disputes sub-
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mise for requiring employers to give up their right to fire at-will, most
commentators assume (correctly) that employers would prefer arbitra-
tion over litigation in court. 29 5 Arbitration is believed to be a faster,
less expensive method for resolving disputes than litigation in court.
Moreover, arbitration takes away the fear of a run-away jury.2 9 6 It is
also a less formal process than litigation in court, which contributes to
its decreased expense. Those who have suggested replacing the at-will
standard with a just cause standard believe it appropriate to give
something to employers in exchange for taking away their right to ter-
minate at-will. 2 97 That something is the arbitration procedure.
However, arbitration is not without its problems. The most obvi-
ous problem is the way that arbitrators are chosen. Arbitrators are
chosen by both parties-the employer and the terminated employee
(or the union in the case of a collective bargaining agreement). Of
course, this is different than litigation in court, where the parties have
virtually no control over the judge to which their case gets assigned.
Because the parties can choose to use or not use a particular arbitra-
tor, the parties are more likely to hire an arbitrator with whom they
have some experience or about whom they have some knowledge.
Where do they get this experience or knowledge? Most likely, a party
picks an arbitrator because the party has used that arbitrator in the
past and has achieved a good result. If the employer is being repre-
sented by a large law firm, as many employers are, knowledge about
the arbitrator is not limited to the particular attorney handling the
case. The attorney that will be litigating the arbitration does and
should seek information about the potential arbitrators from the other
attorneys in the firm.
It should be obvious that if a defendant-employer is being repre-
sented by a large firm and a plaintiff-employee is being represented by
a small firm attorney or solo practitioner, the employer's counsel is
likely to have much more information regarding the prospective arbi-
trators. Arbitrators are certainly aware of this phenomenon and may
(unintentionally) allow their opinion or judgment to be swayed by the
fact that their livelihood is dependant on the parties choosing them
mitted to arbitration most often involve discrimination claims or other statutory
claims.
295. Employers actually supported a statutory elimination of the at-will standard in
Montana, in part because the new "just cause" statute allowed them to avoid liti-
gation by having all disputes resolved in arbitration. See Slater, supra note 2, at
103-04.
296. See Fischl, supra note 22, at 173 (noting that punitive damages are seldom avail-
able in arbitrations).
297. See McGinley, supra note 9, at 1517 (stating that management would benefit
from her proposal to have a national just cause statute with arbitrators hearing
the cases because more employment disputes will be resolved in arbitration,
which is a faster, more cost efficient option than court litigation).
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again or at least giving a good reference. 298 I do not mean to suggest
that arbitrators are incapable of making a non-biased decision regard-
ing the merits of the case. However, if making the ultimate factual
decision is difficult, it is at least possible that their decision making
might be influenced slightly by the need to remain employed in the
future by the parties who choose them.
This problem with arbitration does not just harm the employee.
Even though I have suggested above that arbitrators might favor em-
ployers because they are more likely to be repeat consumers of the
arbitrator's services, there are some disadvantages of arbitration to
employers as well. The main disadvantage is an arbitrator's tendency
to "split the baby" and reinstate an employee without backpay if the
arbitrator thinks that the employer was justified in terminating the
employee, but because of the employee's length of service and good (or
at least not horrible) work history, the employee should be given a
second chance.299 Under the ETEA, the judge or jury would decide
whether a particular termination violated the law. If it did not, the
employee's termination would be sustained, as it should be, in my
opinion.
Many commentators have suggested the use of arbitration as a
compromise because their proposals recommended a just cause stan-
dard.300 This proposal does not use a just cause standard and is much
more lenient to employers than a just cause standard would be, so
compromise in the choice of forum is not as necessary. Furthermore,
the statute already contains compromise by forcing employees to
choose under which statute they sue and limits employees' remedies if
they prove a violation of the statute. Accordingly, the arbitration fo-
rum is not necessary as a compromise and my recommendation would
be that this statute should contain a private right of action by employ-
ees in federal or state court.
298. McGinley recognizes the possible problem of the employer's potential advantage
as a "repeat player" but counters it by stating that "[aittorneys representing em-
ployees before arbitration panels will establish specialties in the area and will
become acquainted very quickly with the habits of members of the arbitration
panels." McGinley, supra note 9, at 1515. She also advises that for employees
not represented by counsel or by a union, the law should require that the em-
ployer have representatives who can advise clients in a confidential manner and
represent them before the arbitration panels. Id. It is unclear to me how these
representatives would not be indirectly "controlled" by the employer.
299. See supra section III.B. Of course, the arbitrators engage in this practice of
"splitting the baby" because of long-standing practice under collective bargaining
agreements. Perhaps, then, this is not a criticism of arbitration but a criticism of
the practices under collective bargaining agreements.
300. See sources cited supra note 293.
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6. Miscellaneous Procedural Matters
a. Minimum Number of Employees
It is obvious that, like other employment statutes, the ETEA could
pose a hardship on very small employers who are often unable to af-
ford defending even one lawsuit. Accordingly, I recommend that the
ETEA follow the course of Title VII, which only covers employers with
fifteen or more employees. 30
b. Termination Only (or Constructive Discharge)
As should be obvious from the title of the statute, this statute only
covers termination decisions and does not address the myriad of other
employment decisions, such as hiring, promotion, demotions, pay in-
creases, or transfers, to name a few. 30 2 The reason I chose to only
cover termination decisions is because of the significance termination
has on employees in the workplace, as the workplace equivalent of
"capital punishment."3 03 Many people have their entire identity
wrapped up in their job or occupation. For them, termination means
not only a loss of regular paychecks, but also "dashed expectations as
to future benefits, a loss of character and personal identity, and the
loss of the financial security one expected."30 4 Another scholar has
said this about termination:
Dismissal affects a person's economic, emotional, and physical health in ways
unparalleled by less drastic forms of discipline or transitory interruptions of
work. Not only does dismissal have immediate financial consequences for the
discharged worker, it also has an economic impact into the future .... The
loss of one's job is felt not only by the individual worker, but by members of his
or her family and the community .... If the termination is the result of
factors other than an employee's conduct or performance, the loss can be
devastating.3
0 5
Even though the primary focus of the statute is actual termina-
tions, where an employee is involuntarily terminated or forced to re-
sign, the statute should also contain a "constructive discharge"
301. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
302. Most discrimination claims these days are termination claims because people are
reluctant to sue their current employer. See Fischl, supra note 22, at 180.
303. Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational Incentives No
Longer Pertain: "Right Sizing" and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO. WASH L. REV. 276,
277-78 (2000); Donna E. Young, Racial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and
Employment At-Will, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 351, 352 (citing MARK A. ROTHSTEIN &
LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 910 (4th ed. 1998)).
304. Schmall, supra note 303, at 278.
305. Young, supra note 303, at 353; see also Malin, supra note 5, at 138 (arguing that
job loss is one of the most stressful experiences as "[iut often stifles the moral,
mental and material development of the terminated employee and has severe
mental and social consequences for her family."). Malin also notes that for many
employees, their jobs are the only property they have and the loss of that prop-
erty can be devastating. Id.
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provision to cover situations where an employee quits because the em-
ployer has gone to great lengths to make the employee's working con-
ditions so miserable as to force the resignation.O6 This provision is
necessary because, without it, employers could avoid liability under
the ETEA by not terminating employees but doing everything possible
to make their lives so miserable that they will quit. To add such a
provision, the statute could define "termination" to include "a quitting
of employment or a retirement by an employee induced by an act or
omission of the employer, after notice to the employer of the act or
omission without appropriate relief by the employer, so intolerable
that under the circumstances a reasonable individual would quit or
retire."30 7
V. A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICS
A. Employers' Concerns
Employers' opposition to this statute will likely be for three pri-
mary reasons. First, they will argue that by prohibiting so many ter-
minations, I have de facto created a just cause standard that will
interfere with their ability to run their businesses autonomously and
efficiently. 3 08 Their second concern would likely be one of cost be-
cause of the fear of increased litigation. Finally, some scholars would
disagree with this alteration of the at-will standard because the de-
fault at-will rule is more efficient.
1. Criticism 1: Just Cause in Disguise
Addressing the first concern, the ETEA will not hinder an em-
ployer's ability to run its business as it sees fit. First of all, most em-
ployers do not knowingly terminate employees for reasons that are
prohibited under the statute.3 09 To the extent that individual super-
visors or managers are making discriminatory and often morally rep-
rehensible termination decisions, those decisions are often not in the
306. E.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141 (2004).
307. This quoted provision is drawn from the MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT
§ 1(8)(iii), 7A U.L.A. 308 (2002).
308. For instance, Richard Epstein has argued that an employer needs the at-will rule
to protect itself from employee shirking, misconduct, and opportunistic behavior.
Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 965
(1984); see also John P. Frantz, Market Ordering Versus Statutory Control of Ter-
mination Decisions: A Case for the Inefficiency of Just Cause Dismissal Require-
ments, 20 HAv. J. L. & PUB. POL'y 555 (1997) (arguing that the at-will
employment presumption is justified because of its efficiency as compared to a
just cause employment presumption)..
309. See Phillips, supra note 12, at 469 (1992)) (employer unlikely to arbitrarily fire
productive workers); Ian Maitland, Rights in the Workplace: A Nozickian Argu-
ment, 8 J. Bus. ETHICS 951, 953 (1989) (employees may prefer employment at-will
because they believe that most employers do not abuse their discretion).
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best interests of the employer as an entity, and employers might bene-
fit from learning through the notice provision requirement that a ter-
mination decision was made that does not benefit the employer and
most certainly harmed the terminated employee. 3 10
Furthermore, this statute does not create a just cause standard. If
the employer has terminated an employee because it wanted to save
money, such an action would not violate the statute, yet might not be
considered just cause if we were under that higher standard.311 The
main difference between this statute and just cause is the burden of
proof. Employers would not be required to prove just cause for the
termination. They only would have to defend their reason for termi-
nation, and their reason cannot have violated one of the prohibitions
in the statute. Contrary to what occurs under collective bargaining
agreements with just cause clauses, if the employer terminated an
employee for misconduct, the statute does not allow a court to consider
an employee's length of service. The employees fired for harassing
others, cheating and lying, or showing up under the influence of alco-
hol would not be reinstated. In other words, the employer does not
need a really good reason; it simply cannot have terminated for a bad
reason-one of the prohibited reasons in the statute. This statute is
not meant to interfere with an employer's legitimate interest in run-
ning its business as long as the reason for termination is not one of the
prohibited reasons.
For those who might think that this statute really is just cause in
disguise, consider the following example. In a recent arbitration case,
the arbitrator discussed the seven elements to test for just cause.3 12
They include: (1) notice, (2) reasonable rule or order, (3) investigation,
(4) fair investigation, (5) proof, (6) equal treatment, and (7) penalty.3 13
Under this proposed statute, numbers 2 and 7, and perhaps 3 and 4,
310. Anecdotally, I know from experience that some employers allow such decisions to
stand because the supervisor is too valuable to cross (even despite his discrimina-
tory termination decisions), but at least the employer could settle with the dis-
charged employee.
311. See, e.g., Village of Herkimer v. Individual Grievant, 84 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA)
1298 (1985) (Klein, Arb.) (holding that employer's contention that it could not
afford grievant's salary could not provide just cause for the termination); Boulder
Yellow Cab, Yellow Cab Coop. Ass'n. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters
Local 435, 102 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 848 (1993) (Watkins, Arb.) (reinstating em-
ployee even though the employee exposed the employer to highly burdensome
insurance rates). The Model Employment Termination Act, however, does con-
template terminations for business reasons as meeting the just cause standard.
See MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 1(4), 7A U.L.A. 308 (2002).
312. Allied Aviation LLP, Dallas/Fort Worth Int'l Airport v. Transport Workers Union,
Air Transport Local 513, 120 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 1785, 1791 (2005) (Jennings,
Arb.) (citing ADOLPH KOVEN & SUSAN SMITH, JUST CAUSE: THE SEVEN TESTS 23-4
(BNA Books 1992)); Enterprise Wire Company v. Enterprise Indep. Union, 46




would not need to be proven. The second element, reasonable rule or
order, states, "Was the Employer's rules or managerial order reasona-
bly related to (a) the orderly, efficient, and safe operation of the Em-
ployer's business, and (b) the performance that the Employer might
properly expect of the employee?" 3 14 I do not believe it is an arbitra-
tor's or other fact finder's job to second guess the reason an employer
has a particular rule. As long as the employee was on notice of the
rule3 15 and the rule is not applied in a discriminatory or arbitrary
manner, the employer should be able to enforce the rule as it sees fit.
With regard to the seventh element, I do not believe an employer
should have to take account of an employee's good service when that
employee has engaged in conduct that would normally result in termi-
nation. Because the ETEA does not require just cause, an employer's
burden is clearly less than it would be if it had to prove these seven
elements.
2. Criticism 2: Costs of Increased Litigation
In response to an employer's concern regarding increased litiga-
tion, I believe that fear is overstated. It is probably true that, initially,
more employees would consider filing lawsuits, but as long as the no-
tice provision 3 16 is working as it was intended, many of these lawsuits
could be avoided. First, many employees might realize that the termi-
nation decision was warranted once they are faced with the truth
about the termination decision. Alternatively, the employer might re-
alize that the termination decision was not in the employer's best in-
terest but rather only benefited some opportunistic manager. In these
cases, the employer would likely decide to either reinstate the em-
ployee or settle with the employee to avoid litigation. Even if more
lawsuits are filed initially, the overall risk of liability is much less be-
cause the potential damages are less profitable for employees. 3 17
I do not mean to suggest that the fear of increased litigation is mer-
itless. Indeed, courts and employers would be rightfully concerned
about the proliferation of lawsuits under the ETEA. While my intui-
tion tells me that, based on some of the procedural provisions in the
314. Id.
315. Sometimes even the notice requirement can be taken too far. Recall the case of
the UPS driver who was under the influence of alcohol while working, but be-
cause the rules did not explicitly state that it is a violation of the rule to be under
the influence of alcohol even though not over the legal limit for drunk driving, the
arbitrator reinstated the employee. See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying
text. As I stated earlier, an employer should have to give notice of most rules, but
some things are just common sense. Most employers do not include a work rule:
"You will be fired if you kill a fellow employee," but I would hope that most em-
ployees would know that even without an explicit work rule stating it.
316. See supra subsection IV.D.3.
317. See supra subsection IV.D.4.
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statute, the court overload fear is overstated; I certainly cannot know
that with any type of certainty. It might be that a few years after the
ETEA was enacted, the courts would be drowning in lawsuits. Be-
cause we cannot know that for certain, my advice would be to take a
"wait and see" stance. If the overload on courts is really too great,
perhaps then we consider some type of arbitration board or specialized
court to handle these and other types of employment claims.
3. Criticism 3: The At-Will Rule Is More Efficient
Scholars in support of the at-will presumption will argue that at-
will is an appropriate standard because it represents the contract
term that employees voluntarily choose when entering into employ-
ment contracts. In other words, employees must prefer the at-will
standard because if they wanted just cause protection, they would bar-
gain for it. Professor J. Hoult Verkerke suggests that the courts
should reaffirm the at-will doctrine as a default rule. 3 18 His research
of 221 employers in five states concluded that 52% of employers explic-
itly contract for at-will employment, 33% have no contractual relation-
ship, and 15% contract for just cause protection.319 Professor
Verkerke believes that this empirical data strongly supports a reaffir-
mation of the at-will default rule because an overwhelming majority of
employers either explicitly contract for at-will employment or allow
for the default rule of at-will employment to apply.3 20 Moreover, he
argues that if employees want protection from the at-will doctrine,
they should bargain for just cause protection individually with their
employers.32 1 His theory assumes either that individual employees
have the power to bargain with their prospective employers to reach a
mutually beneficial contractual agreement, or that absent such power,
individual employees will choose to only work for employers who offer
just cause protection. Both assumptions are false.
As Professor Slater has pointed out, most employees without just
cause protection would never bargain for it.322 Slater points out the
absurdity of a low-level employee having the knowledge and courage
to ask for a just cause standard. As Slater questions, "Who would
write the agreement?" Additionally, what would a manager do if an
employee asked for a just cause contract?3 23 The manager would
318. See J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on Indefinite Term Employment
Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 837.
319. Id. at 867.
320. Id. at 913.
321. Id.; see also Peter Stone Partee, Reversing the Presumption of Employment At
Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689, 702 (1991) (arguing that while some employees do not
have bargaining power, many or most do).
322. Slater, supra note 2, at 100; Blades, supra note 109, at 1411 (arguing that indi-
vidual employees do not have bargaining power to get a just cause contract).
323. Slater, supra note 2, at 100.
[Vol. 87:62
THE PERFECT COMPROMISE
probably think it was very odd324 and very annoying because it would
mean that this particular employee would get some kind of special
treatment. My guess is that the manager would either refuse to hire
the employee, or if he was hired, the employee would have a bad repu-
tation. For all of these reasons, individually bargained-for just cause
contracts are practically non-existent (with the possible exception of
highly compensated executives), but this does not mean that employ-
ees do not value job security.32 5
In response to the second assumption above-that employees will
only choose to work for employers who offer just cause-I am not alone
in believing such an assumption to be false and even bordering on lu-
dicrous. For instance, Professor Malin argues that an employer's con-
cern over its reputation is not likely to be an effective deterrent. 3 26 As
Malin points out, there are no "consumer reports" rating employ-
ers.3 27 Some argue that employers do not make arbitrary employ-
ment decisions because they are deterred from doing so by the threat
of losing employees who would not want to work for such an em-
ployer.328 However, most employees would not choose to leave an em-
ployer who discharges arbitrarily because they are not in a financial
position to do so. 329
Commentators also argue that most employees, even if armed with
information about at-will employment, would still choose it because it
would presumably carry with it more money. In other words, if an
employer was willing to provide just cause protection to an individual
employee, such protection would come at the cost of a lower salary.3 3 0
Nevertheless, as Professor Phillips points out, the main problem with
this argument is the "uncertainty surrounding its premise."331 While
some younger, riskier employees would prefer money over security,
there are many others who would prefer security. 33 2 While it is not
324. Id. (comparing an employee asking for just cause to a new law professor asking
for the school to buy a pet pony for his child instead of paying for moving
expenses).
325. Id. at 101.
326. Malin, supra note 5, at 143 (arguing that employees are not likely to have infor-
mation necessary to make a decision to quit based on an employer's no-cause
terminations, and certainly new hires will lack this information); Blades, supra
note 109, at 1413 (stating that an employer's interest in maintaining a favorable
reputation cannot be regarded as a very substantial deterrent). But see Sonne,
supra note 223, at 287 (agreeing with Richard Posner that employers will get a
bad reputation if they arbitrarily fire employees and that this fear will keep them
from exhibiting predatory behavior).
327. Malin, supra note 5, at 143.
328. Phillips, supra note 12, at 469.
329. Id. at 471.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 474.
332. Id. at 474-75.
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the purpose of this Article to fully exhaust the debate over the eco-
nomic efficiency of the at-will default rule, suffice it to say that I do
not believe the arguments supporting at-will are strong enough to
override the compelling problems the at-will rule causes. 333
B. Criticisms from the Plaintiff's Perspective
As a compromise statute, the ETEA is likely to garner criticisms
from both sides. Plaintiffs will likely complain that (1) the proposal is
too narrow because it still allows an employer to make a bad business
decision, even if that decision is not made with a bad motive and (2)
the statute will actually decrease the number of successful discrimina-
tion or other wrongful discharge suits because plaintiffs may feel com-
pelled to choose the easier remedy of the ETEA, even though the
statute does not give them as many rights or benefits as a claim under
Title VII or under a wrongful discharge theory.
1. ETEA Is Too Narrow
The inevitable plaintiffs' criticism is that this statute is too narrow
because it does not require just cause for a termination. In other
words, if an employer makes a bad business decision, i.e., terminates
an employee it believes to be unproductive, when in reality the em-
ployee is very productive, the termination will not violate the
ETEA.334 Alternatively, if an employer fires an employee for violating
a very strict attendance rule, the employee will not be able to prove a
violation of the ETEA.335 The purpose of using the prohibitions in
this statute rather than a just cause standard is to avoid judges and
juries second guessing employers' business decisions. Even if a deci-
sion might seem terrible from a reasonable person's perspective (or
even a reasonable business manager's perspective), the difficulty in
proving just cause warrants not using that standard.33 6
It is true that if an employee is fired for a reason that does not
make sense to him, the employee is likely to experience many of the
same deleterious feelings as if he had been fired for a reason that vio-
lated this statute.3 37 Yet, what he would not experience is the harm
to his dignity that arises from the terminations that violate the
333. See supra Part III.
334. If, however, the employee can prove that the employer's proffered reason (non-
productivity) is not true and was not the real reason for the termination, then the
employee will win.
335. The only exception to this would be if the absence fell under the FMLA expansion
prohibition. See supra subsection IV.B.4.
336. See supra section III.B.
337. See supra subsection IV.E.6.b (discussing the harmful effects of termination).
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ETEA.338 Knowing that your employer made a bad business decision
is not as hurtful as knowing it made a decision based on your race or
because you complained of offensive behavior in the workplace. More-
over, this statute does not use just cause because doing so would cer-
tainly lead to its demise. This statute is a compromise statute, and as
such, plaintiffs must be willing to give something up in exchange for
getting much more protection than they have today.
2. Statute Would Undermine Discrimination Laws
The criticism that employees might choose suit under the ETEA
because of its easier burden of proof may be a legitimate concern. If a
plaintiff does not have very good evidence of discriminatory motive,
yet has been given an obviously phony reason for the termination,
many risk-averse plaintiffs are likely to choose the ETEA over Title
VII or a state anti-discrimination law. To the extent that those em-
ployees would have been successful in their discrimination suits, such
a result would be troubling. However, as stated earlier, most employ-
ees are not successful in their discrimination lawsuits. 33 9 Further-
more, for many employees, receiving reinstatement and back pay (and
perhaps front pay) is their primary concern. While there are some
plaintiffs seeking and receiving large compensatory and punitive dam-
age awards, 340 they tend to be the exceptions rather than the norm.34 1
In my practical experience, many employment discrimination cases
settle for a reasonable estimate of the back pay and front pay dam-
ages. Accordingly, the damages under the ETEA are not much differ-
ent than the damages likely to be received in a Title VII lawsuit.
Finally, I think the ETEA would have a positive effect on eradicating
discrimination because it would discourage employers from
fabricating reasons for dismissal. Because of the burden of proof
structure under the ETEA,342 an employer can no longer escape liabil-
338. Some ETEA violations are based on the harm to the public, but with most of
them, it can also be said that a termination for fulfilling a duty that benefits the
public is offensive to one's dignity.
339. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05 (discussing the failure rates for em-
ployment discrimination claims).
340. See supra subsection IV.E.4.
341. First of all, proving compensatory damages is not easy and can be very invasive.
An employee has to be willing to testify about very private emotions and possibly
allow the defense to have access to private medical and psychological records.
Second, under Title VII, punitive damages are not easy to get. The employee has
to prove that the employer "engaged in a discriminatory practice or discrimina-
tory practices with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual." Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2000).
342. See supra subsection IV.E.2. Under the ETEA, the plaintiff would only have to
prove that the defendant's reason was false; it would not also have to prove that
discrimination or one of the prohibited terminations was the real reason for the
20081
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
ity by making up false reasons for termination. The employer is
forced to disclose very early on the reason for the termination, 34 3 and
if the employer lies about its reason and the plaintiff can prove the
employer's reason was pretextual, the plaintiff wins.
A related but distinct concern might be that the ETEA has pre-
empted common law wrongful discharge claims. For individuals who
might have had a strong public policy claim-for instance, because
they were fired for refusing to engage in illegal behavior requested by
the employer-the inability to get unlimited compensatory and puni-
tive damages will certainly be frustrating. However, most public pol-
icy claims are not as clear cut as the one just mentioned. We saw
earlier the myriad of egregious terminations left unremedied by
wrongful discharge suits, 344 and the courts' inconsistency in ruling on
these claims makes victory for plaintiffs even more elusive. Finally, if
the ETEA did not preempt state law public policy claims, it is highly
unlikely that it would be palatable to businesses and, therefore, would
be unlikely to gain political support. 34 5 The ETEA is a compromise
statute and this compromise is necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
As a compromise proposal, either no one wins or everyone wins,
depending on your perspective and level of optimism. Certainly, some
will argue that my proposal does not provide enough benefits for em-
ployees because of the limited remedies and because it does not pro-
hibit all bad termination decisions. Conversely, some will argue that
this proposal is way too broad because at-will is the better default
rule, and there are already enough limitations on an employer's abil-
ity to terminate its employees. However, if both sides compare it to
the status quo today-chaos in the law, potential for outrageous dam-
ages, and the sheer magnitude of unsuccessful claims-perhaps both
sides can view it in an optimistic light, as the perfect compromise.
termination. See supra subsection IV.E.2. As stated above, that varies from Title
VII law, where an employee does not necessarily win by proving that the defen-
dant's alleged reason for termination is fabricated. See supra subsection IV.E.2.
343. See supra subsection IV.E.3 (discussing the notice provision).
344. See supra subsection III.A.2.
345. This is because of the fear of unlimited damages and run-away juries.
[Vol. 87:62
